Douglas MacArthur II

Un échange de lettres entre Paul Vanden BOEYNANTS et Douglas MACARTHUR II est sur :

http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/79942632/Correspondance-Vanden-Boeynants-Macarthur-II

Cet échange s'est fait via Jean JOSI.

Il serait intéressant d'en savoir plus sur Jean JOSI.

On peut émettre l'hypothèse que Jean JOSI est en lien avec le Carlton ...

Sur le Carlton (et Paul CAMS), voir :

http://www.scribd.com/doc/76853139/Kirschen-Et-Co-Paul-Cams

A noter : la maison de Paul CAMS est occupée par Sergio FERRARI dont parle le dossier PANDA :

http://www.scribd.com/doc/76852932/Panda

Outre Sergio FERRARI, grand ami de feu Me Jean-Paul DUMONT, on y parle de Placido PALERMO au sujet duquel il serait intéressant d'en savoir plus ... avec précaution ... A ma connaissance, il tenait une station-service à Namur et était le vrai propriétaire d'une pizzeria à Messancy.

Sur le groupe JOSI, tiré de :

Main basse sur Bruxelles
Par Georges Timmerman
1991 - 168 pages

(...) Il faut encore mentionner un troisième assureur-investisseur immobilier : le groupe Josi. Il y a quelques années, ce groupe familial faisait encore partie du Top 5 du secteur de l'assurance, une situation qui a bien changé aujourd'hui. La société centrale du groupe est le Groupe d'Assurances Josi qui a pour actionnaires le Holding Groupe Josi (59,4 %) et Cobepa (20,1 %). Son conseil d'administration comprend quelques noms ronflants. Aux côtés du président Jean-Pierre Laurent Josi (beau-fils du fondateur) siègent Pierre Scohier (Cobepa), Albert Frère, Aldo Vastapane, Adolphe Blaton (groupe Blaton) et Pierre Salik (Salik International). Le président du conseil de contrôle des sociétés d'assurances du groupe Josi était, jusqu'il y a peu, le baron Louis du Roy de Blicquy. Le groupe a notamment une participation dans la Société Internationale de Participation Financière (SIPF), un des financiers du groupe Blaton.

Depuis le milieu des années 80, le groupe Josi se porte plutôt mal. L'entreprise s'est retrouvée en seizième position du classement des assureurs belges. Elle s'est débarrassée de certains de ses actifs. Le groupe a entrepris une restructuration en profondeur en 1988 : 10 % du personnel en a fait les frais. Depuis le début de 1990, des rumeurs circulent selon lesquelles l'assureur Josi serait à la recherche d'un repreneur. Via des astuces comptables, une perte cumulée de 613 millions a pu être masquée en 1989. Mais il est douteux que Josi puisse encore jouer un rôle significatif, dans un proche avenir, sur le marché immobilier bruxellois.

(...)

Un des administrateurs de Bernheim-Comofi est Aldo Vastapane, par l'entremise de diverses firmes occupées à l'aéroport de Zaventem. Vastapane est administrateur - notamment - de GBL et du groupe d'assurances Josi. Il est un ami intime de VdB. Peu après le dénouement de son enlèvement, VdB a été signalé à Kinshasa, en compagnie de Vastapane.

(...)

Le fondateur Jean-Marie Josi (1908-1979), un self-made-man anversois, a construit après 1945 un impressionnant conglomérat : asurances automobiles, importateur de Mercedes-Benz en Belgique et au Zaïre (IMA, repris en 1980 par Mercedes-Benz Belgium), firmes de taxis à Bruxelles (ATB, Taxis René), une chaîne de garages, des immobilières, des hôtels (hôtel Belson) et des restaurants (Carlton), et, pour terminer, des intérêts dans le monde de la presse ( Pourquoi Pas ? et l'Echo de la Bourse ). De plus, Josi qui siégeait au conseil d'administration de la BBL et de la Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas (financier du projet WTC), a mis un pied dans le commerce de viande avec VdB ( Primus Belgium ) et a conclu un pacte avec la famille Vastapane pour la construction d'une série de restaurants et de magasins dans la région bruxelloise.

(...)

La tour ITT, haute de 24 étages, a pu être construite, malgré de vives protestations, frâce à l'intervention efficace de Paul-Henri Spaak et de VdB. Au début des années 60, Spaak a été recruté comme administrateur de Bell Telephone Company, la filiale belge de la multinationale américaine ITT, par l'amiral Ellery (Earl Everett) Stone. Cet ancien officier de la marine américaine était à l'époque un cadre de haut niveau de ITT et faisait en Europe du lobbying au plus haut niveau. Apparemment, Bruxelles était pour lui un terrain de travail important, où il disposait en permanence d'une suite à l'hôtel Métropole. Précédemment, dans la période 1948-1951, l'amiral Stone dirigeait l' Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA), un service ultra-secret de l'armée américaine et précurseur de l'actuel National Security Agency. Sources : ITT, The Sovereign State, Anthony Sampson, Hodder and Stoughon, 1973, et The Puzzle Palace, James Bamford, Penguin, 1983.

(...)

Note : le fils du baron Baudouin Gilles de Pélichy, administrateur honoraire d'An-Hyp, est lui aussi un adhérent connu de l'Opus Dei.

Opus Dei en Belgique, André Van Bosbeke, EPO, 1985

(...)

L'affaire des parcmètres, devenue plus tard aussi celle des abribus et du mobilier urbain à Liège, est peut-être le début d'une "série de dossiers de corruption que la Justice ouvrira prochainement à l'encontre de politiciens et de fonctionnaires, si le dossier en cours à charge de Bonvoisin n'est pas boycotté", écrivait de Standaard en juin 1990.

(...)

En 1967, De Pauw devient président de Brussels Airways, une firme dont le but est d'exploiter le transport aérien de personnes. Outre les tours WTC, De Pauw prévoyait d'installer un héliport. Une entreprise qui ne vit jamais le jour. Mais il est important d'analyser, dans ce contexte, les associés de CDP. Le vice-président de Brussels Airways est Jean-Marie Josi, de la compagnie d'assurances du même nom. Sont aussi de la partie : Adolphe (Ado) Blaton et Dino Vastapane (le patron de Martini-Rossi et frère d'Ado Vastapane, propriétaire de plusieurs concessions à l'aéroport de Zaventem, également actif dans le secteur immobilier).

Entre le groupe De Pauw et le groupe Blaton, aussi familial que bruxellois, tout baigne dans l'huile.

(...)

Dans le holding Compagnie de Gestion A. et J. Blaton, certaines participations contrôlées auparavant par Bâtiments & Ponts ont également été reprises : Immo Eendracht (33 %, une collaboration avec le groupe De Pauw), le parc Savoy (11 %, exploitation du restaurant mondain du Cercle des Nations (...) dans certaines de ces entrepries, on découvre des liens commerciaux entre Blaton et Pierre Salik, le fabricant de jeans condamné en appel en 1987 à trois ans de prison pour fraude fiscale. (...) Pierre Salik était membre du Cercle des Nations, administrateur du groupe Josi et de la Codenaat, la société tombée en faillite gérant jusqu'il y a peu le restaurant du Cercle des nations.

(...) C'est dans le building Mercedes à la place Rogier - construit en 1957 à la place de l'ancienne gare du Nord - qu'était situé, jusqu'il y a peu, le Centre International Rogier. le bâtiment doit son nom de l'énorme étoile Mercedes qui tourne sur le toit (en Belgique, Mercedes-Benz est dans les mains du groupe Josi). On l'appelle aussi parfois le building Martini, en raison de la réclame qui a longtemps illuminé le ciel bruxellois.

(...)

Depuis 1983, Maurice Lippens assure la fonction d'administrateur délégué des AG. Il est le frère du bourgmestre CVP de Knokke-Heist, bien connu pour sa campagne contre les frigo-box. Valère Croes, directeur générale du groupe AG, entretient d'excellentes relations avec différents hommes politiques de haut vol. En février 1990, il fut nommé président de la puissante association professionnelle des compagnies d'assurances (APCA). Le chevalier Jean de Broux, président d'honneur des AG et membre du Cercle des Nations, s'est profilé comme un ardent promoteur du tourisme à Bruxelles. En 1977, il a plaidé auprès des autorités nationales en faveur de l'implantation d'un casino à l'hôtel Carlton, à Bruxelles. Cette implkantation devait bénéficier à Paul Cams, un personnage qui fut par la suite assassiné dans des circonstances jamais élucidées. Le Carlton appartient à l'empire du groupe Josi.

_ _ _

Sur Paul Cams :

http://www.scribd.com/doc/76853139/Kirschen-Et-Co-Paul-Cams

et sur celui qui a repris la maison de Paul Cams à Ganshoren :

http://www.scribd.com/doc/76853139/Kirschen-Et-Co-Paul-Cams

Citation :

Pierre Salik était membre du Cercle des Nations, administrateur du groupe Josi et de la Codenaat, la société tombée en faillite gérant jusqu'il y a peu le restaurant du Cercle des nations.

Un autre éclairage intéressant ...

Douglas MacArthur II était ambassadeur des USA au Japon de 1957 à 1961. Un élément bien documenté est l'exigence des USA d'installer des armes nucléaires au Japon et les réticences de la population.

Voir :

http://www.bancpublic.be/PAGES/139recuperations.htm

(...) En 1957, son ami Nobusuke Kishi , après avoir occupé le poste de Secrétaire général du PLD, devient Premier ministre et entreprend de récompenser ses alliés de toujours. Le yakuza Ichiro Kono, élu à la Diète, est ainsi nommé ministre de l'Agriculture tandis que le monopole de la gestion des paris sur les courses de hors-bords est confié à Ryoichi Sasakawa.

Dans la même période, Kodama participe à la création de la Ligue anti-communiste des peuples d'Asie (People's Anti-Communist League - APACL) qui donnera naissance à la Ligue anti-communiste mondiale (World Anti-Communist League - WACL).

En 1960, alors que les rares mouvements de gauche encore existants tentent de s'opposer à la ratification d'un nouveau traité de sécurité autorisant les États-Unis à installer des armes nucléaires sur le territoire japonais , Kishi fait appel à Kodama pour casser le Conseil du peuple contre la révision du traité de sécurité (l'Ampo). Malgré l'opposition, Kishi ratifiera de force le traité en interdisant l'accès du Parlement aux socialistes.

L'affaire Lockheed

En 1976, Kodama sera rattrapé par un énorme scandale qui jette une lumière crue sur les rapports entre le monde des affaires, les politiciens, les yakusas, et la CIA. La firme fait appel à Kodama pour vendre son nouvel appareil de transport civil, le Tristar L-1011.

(...)

http://openvault.wgbh.org/catalog/vietnam-4ab69e-interview-with-douglas-macarthur-1982

U.S. support of the French in Indochina in relation to communist expansion

VIETNAM
TVP 002
DOUGLAS MacARTHUR, II
SR 5F...
Ch
This is WGBH, July 2, 1982 ...doing an interview with
Ambassador Douglas MacArthur.


(...)

De la correspondance relative à l'ambassade et à Douglas MacArthur II est disponible sur :


http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81567720/Correspondance-Ambassade-MacArthur-II

Deux autres documents relatifs à Douglas MacArthur II sont disponibles sur :

http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81581028/MacArthur-II-Secret-January-14-1957

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81581195/MacArthur-II-Confidential-Cable-Oct-23-1962

Ils montrent bien l'importance pour les USA de l'installation d'armes nucléaires dans des pays alliés ainsi que leurs préoccupations au sujet de Cuba.

Sur Paul-Henri Spaak, voir :

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paul-Henri_Spaak

Voir

http://www.adst.org/OH%20TOCs/MacArthur,%20Douglas%20II%20.toc.pdf

Je me demande ce que faisait Douglas MacArthur II en 18 avril 1948 quand les élections italiennes ont été gagnées par Alcide de Gasperi contre les communistes.

Les "services" américains ont joué un rôle important.

Voir le livre " La guerre froide revisitée "

(...) Au moment où la doctrine Truman et la plan Marshall sont conçus en 1947-1948, le National Security Council, dans sa directive NSC 10/2 approuvée en juin 1948 par Truman, souligne l'importance des opérations psychologiques dont se chargent la jeune CIA, créée en 1947, et le département d'Etat, sous l'impulsion du Policy Planning Staff de George Kennan qui supervise un Office of Special Projects. Renforcé après le coup de Prague et les élections italiennes d'avril 1948, ce bureau est renommé Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), confié à Frank Winer et rattaché formellement à la CIA. L'OPC, en rapide développement, dispose d'un large mandat et de fonds considérables (...)

Les élections italiennes d'avril 1948, dont l'enjeu est considérable, créent un précédent en faisant converger les encouragements officiels à la démocratie chrétienne, un soutien candestin massif pour empêcher la victoire communiste, et la mobilisation, stimulée discrètement par l'administration, des associations privées italo-américaines pour plaider, via des milliers de lettres envoyées en Italie, les vertus de l'American way of life et les dangers du communisme.

(...)

Note : quand on parle des "cow-boys" de l'OPC de Frank Wisner, je pense à la thèse de John Loftus sur "la CIA au sein de la CIA" ...

Douglas MacArthur II intervient dans la vidéo suivante (après environ 6 minutes) :

http://www.c-spanvideo.org/program/WorldM

Il s'agit d'un événement de la secte Moon.

A noter: la présence de Arnaud de Borchgrave (Washington Times, créé par Moon)

D'autres informations relatives à Douglas MacArthur II :


http://werzit.com/intel/terrorism/groups/mek/

_ _ _ _ _


http://www.gale.cengage.com/pdf/scguides/macarthur/RG-21.doc

[DOC]

Photo of Douglas MacArthur II and Gaston Henry-Hage concerning an ... Secretary of State with Douglas MacArthur II on board MacArthur's yacht, June 8, 1956 ...

Newsclippings of Douglas MacArthur II

Douglas MacArthur II, former secretary at American Embassy in Germany, arrives with his cocker spaniel on the liner Gripsholm with 558 other Americans from German captivity, March 16, 1944

Photo of Douglas MacArthur II and Gaston Henry-Hage concerning an exchange about their interment in Germany

Douglas MacArthur II succeeds John Allison as envoy to Japan; Ambassador MacArthur II with Aiichiro Fujiyama, Japan’s foreign minister, June 23, 1960

Secretary of State with Douglas MacArthur II on board MacArthur’s yacht, June 8, 1956

Douglas MacArthur II helps set up Big Four Conference

American Delegation: President Dwight D. Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles listening to Ambassador to Russia Charles E. Bohlen, July 20, 1955; General MacArthur’s nephew assigned to Eisenhower

Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II rebuffs Japanese socialists, May 24, 1955

Two Herald Tribune articles: "Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador to Japan," and "Ambassador MacArthur II Handles anti-American Protests“

Two articles on Douglas MacArthur II’s appointment to Tokyo envoy post

_ _ _ _ _


Il pourrait y avoir des informations complémentaires sur Douglas MacArthur II à la bibliothèque suivante :

http://oralhistoryportal.cul.columbia.edu/document.php?id=ldpd_4077218

mais il ne semble pas facile de les obtenir ...

A lire sur le site suivant :

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:2:./temp/~ammem_Pbdh::

The Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training

Interview with Douglas MacArthur II

Go to: Bibliographic Information

The Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project

AMBASSADOR DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, II

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

Initial interview date: December 15, 1986

http://books.google.be/books?id=NgN64EXv8mgC&pg=PA293&lpg=PA293&dq=%22douglas+MacArthur+II%22,+Belgium&source=bl&ots=1TyhziGkVa&sig=sx6lpp9fs45yd2_78EHoQvkB7KY&hl=fr&sa=X&ei=lQ4-T--lOseu8QPpwtiXCA&ved=0CE8Q6AEwBTgU#v=onepage&q=Kishi&f=false



The political economy of Third World intervention: mines, money, and U.S ...

Par David N. Gibbs

(...)

_ _ _ _ _


(page 118)



The Procolonial Bloc in the Kennedy Administration


The Kennedy administration was not of one opinion on the Congo Crisis. An influential group of policymakers within the administration sympathised with Tshombe, with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Some of these policymakers had ties to Belgian business interests.



(...)



Another restraining influence was the U.S. ambassador to Belgiium, Douglas MacArthur II, nephew of the famous general. Undoubtedly Ambassador MacArthur was influenced by the strongly pro-Katanga atmosphere that prevailed in Belgium.



(page 119)



It is perfectly understandable, for purely bureaucratic reasons, that MacArthur had a pro-Belgian viewpoint. He was, after all, ambassador to Belgium, and it is not unusual for ambassadors to develop "localitis." Ambassador MacArthur, moreover, was influenced by Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, whom the ambassador admired. Finally, MacArthur may have been influenced by Belgian business interests. After his retirement from government service, he became a "business consultant and director of several Belgian and American companies." He also joined the American Chamber of Commerce in Belgium. MacArthur never became an advocate for Tshombe, and he cooperated to some extent with the administration polcy. The ambassador did, however, oppose using military force to end the secession.



President Kennedy himself had some pro-Katanga connections. Alan Kirk, a former admiral who had help arrange Kennedy's commission as a naval officer during World War II, had close ties to the Belgian interests. Kirk, who had also served as ambassador to Belgium, was president of the Belgo-American Developement Corporation during the Kennedy Administration. The Belgo-American firm was described as the "center of information between Société Générale, Union Minière and such American financial interests as may in due course be interested in participating in appropriate investments." Thus Admiral Kirk acted as a front for the Belgian interests. (...)


_ _ _


Note 78 : A former U.S. ambassador to Belgium stated that Leon Lambert, of the Lambert group, "was a very great admirer of Paul-Henri Spaak" (Douglas MacArthur II, interview with author, April 30, 1987).

http://books.google.be/books?id=n3c_gKdOXAcC&pg=PA297&lpg=PA297&dq=%22douglas+MacArthur+II%22&source=bl&ots=UAB3j6APER&sig=GXwfIJgJfrVlybgAj_BuugvZOiM&hl=fr&sa=X&ei=EA4-T-qRLJO68gPbuMWcCA&ved=0CCIQ6AEwADhQ#v=onepage&q=%22douglas%20MacArthur%20II%22&f=false


Gold warriors: America's secret recovery of Yamashita's gold

Par Sterling Seagrave,Peggy Seagrave


(...) During Kishi's term as prime minister (1957-1960) the LDP received $ 10-million each year directly from the CIA, chiefly from the M-fund. Alfred C. Ulmer, Jr, the CIA officer who controlled the M-Fund and mny other operations in Japan from 1955 to 1958, said : "We financed them," because the CIA "depended on the LDP for information." When the party's coffers were depleted by the monumental effort to get Kishi named prime minister, Finance Minister Sato Eisaku (Kishi's brother) appealed to Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II for additional secret funds. In July 1958, Ambassador MacArthur wrote to the Department of State, providing details of this request : "Sato asked if it would not be possible for the United States to supply financial funds to aid the conservative forces in this constant struggle against Communism. ... This did not come as a surprise to us, since he suggested the same general idea last year."
The ball then was lobbed into Nixon's court.





Note : The New York Times, October 9, 1994

http://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/09/world/cia-spent-millions-to-support-japanese-right-in-50-s-and-60-s.html?scp=1&sq=9%20october%201994,%20CIA%20spent%20millions&st=cse


C.I.A. Spent Millions to Support Japanese Right in 50's and 60's
By TIM WEINER,

WASHINGTON, Oct. 8— In a major covert operation of the cold war, the Central Intelligence Agency spent millions of dollars to support the conservative party that dominated Japan's politics for a generation.

The C.I.A. gave money to the Liberal Democratic Party and its members in the 1950's and the 1960's, to gather intelligence on Japan, make the country a bulwark against Communism in Asia and undermine the Japanese left, said retired intelligence officials and former diplomats.


(...)

By 1953, with the American occupation over and the reverse course well under way, the C.I.A. began working with warring conservative factions in Japan. In 1955, these factions merged to form the Liberal Democratic Party.

The fact that money was available from the United States soon was known at the highest levels of the Japanese Government.

On July 29, 1958, Douglas MacArthur 2d, the general's nephew, who was then United States Ambassador in Tokyo, wrote to the State Department that Eisaku Sato, the Finance Minister, had asked the United States Embassy for money. Mr. Sato was Prime Minister of Japan from 1964 to 1972 and received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1974.

Ambassador MacArthur wrote that such requests from the Government of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi were nothing new. "Eisaku Sato, Kishi's brother, has tried to put the bite on us for financial help in fighting Communism," his letter said. "This did not come as a surprise to us, since he suggested the same general idea last year."

Mr. Sato was worried, an accompanying memo explained, because a secret slush fund established by Japanese companies to aid the L.D.P. was drained.

"Mr. Sato asked if it would not be possible for the United States to supply financial funds to aid the conservative forces in this constant struggle against Communism," the memo said. While it is unclear whether Mr. Sato's request was granted directly, a decision to finance the 1958 election campaign was discussed and approved by senior national security officials, according to recently declassified C.I.A. documents and former intelligence officers.

In an interview, Mr. MacArthur said the Socialists in Japan had their own secret funds from Moscow, a charge the left denied.

"The Socialist Party in Japan was a direct satellite of Moscow" in those years, he said. "If Japan went Communist it was difficult to see how the rest of Asia would not follow suit. Japan assumed an importance of extraordinary magnitude because there was no other place in Asia from which to project American power."

A Close Call In 1976

In 1976, the secret payments were almost uncovered.

A United States Senate subcommittee discovered that Lockheed Corp., seeking lucrative aircraft contracts, had paid $12 million in bribes to Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka and the Liberal Democrats. The conduit was Mr. Kodama -- political fixer, tungsten smuggler and C.I.A. contact.

Then a retired C.I.A. officer living in Hawaii phoned in a startling tip.

"It's much, much deeper than just Lockheed," Jerome Levinson, the panel's staff director, recalls the C.I.A. man saying. "If you really want to understand Japan, you have to go back to the formation of the L.D.P. and our involvement in it."

Mr. Levinson said in an interview that his superiors rejected his request to pursue the matter.

"This was one of the most profound secrets of our foreign policy," he said. "This was the one aspect of our investigation that was put on hold. We got to Japan, and it really all just shut down."



Photos: Douglas MacArthur 2d, left (Karin Anderson for The New York Times), at his home during an interview on Thursday. He wrote the above letter to the State Department in 1958 when he was Ambassador to Japan. The letter discusses the request of Eisako Sato, Japan's Finance Minister, right (Pictorial Parade, 1971), for money from the United States Embassy. An accompanying memo explained that Mr. Sato was worried because a secret fund, established by Japanese companies to help the conservative party, was drained. (pg. 14)

Pour juger de l'importance de Douglas MacArthur II lors de la crise katangaise, il est instructif de voir les occurences de son nom dans le document suivant :

http://cisupa.proquest.com/ksc_assets/catalog/9252_JFKNSFAfrica1stSupp.pdf

J'ai parcouru rapidement la longue interview de Douglas MacArthur II disponible sur :

http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mfdip.2004mac03

La Belgique est surtout abordée dans le dernier quart du document.

Il ne faut pas s'attendre à des déclarations fracassantes dans un exercice de ce genre mais cela demeure intéressant.

C'est ainsi que l'on apprend que Douglas MacArthur II a beaucoup étudié le français.

Il connaissait aussi la Belgique avant d'y être nommé ambassadeur.


MACARTHUR: No. In 1948, I was reassigned to Brussels. The department said--Ted Achilles, one of our Foreign Service officers who was in charge of western Europe, said that he wanted me to come back to the department to head up the western European bureau, but he wanted me to serve in another country before I went back to that position, because, except for Canada, I'd been tied up with France and the aftermath thereof. With the exception of Canada and Italy, I'd been tied up with France almost continuously for eight years. Of course, being tied up with France, I was tied up with other countries, too, because the peace negotiations and the whole business of Europe that had been occupied by Germany, the Netherlands and Belgium and Luxembourg, and all of it was part of our overall hold.

So I was assigned to Brussels, and I went there, and that is where I had the great good fortune to meet one of the great statesmen of that period, Paul-Henri Spaak, Belgium's great foreign minister. When I was there, he was both prime minister and foreign minister. I used to have lunch with him occasionally. I was chargé d'affaires when Alan Kirk was away a couple of times, before he went to Moscow. Admiral Kirk was our ambassador, under whom I served. The wife of the number two guy was very ill, and he was gone for quite a single period of time, so I had the great good fortune of being the chargé d'affaires there on occasion, and got to know Spaak awfully well and some of his people, which helped me a great deal later, when I went as ambassador to Belgium. Spaak was still very much "Mr. Belgium" in terms of foreign affairs. I was in Belgium just under a year. [telephone interruption]

Q: When you were back in Belgium. We're talking about Henri Spaak.

MACARTHUR: Well, about Spaak. You remember he was the first person that had the guts to face up to the Soviets in the United Nations in 1946, when he made his famous speech. He was a brilliant orator; he never read a speech in his life; he never wrote a speech in his life. He made notes, and he had a mind that worked like a computer; everything fed in and came out in orderly fashion, in the way he wanted it to come in. He made his famous speech to the United Nations, in which he said, "Mr. Vishinsky, we are afraid." It was on what the Russians were doing and the way they were behaving in 1946, moving in and pushing into eastern Europe, toward Czechoslovakia and the like. "Monsieur Vishinsky, nous avons peur," was the way he put it in that famous speech.


Il a aussi été très proche du SHAPE (en France à l'origine) :


General Eisenhower realized that in each of the member countries of NATO--there were 12 founding members--each one had its own particular problems or views or domestic political situations or domestic economic situations that politically in that country were important to the party in power.

So what General Eisenhower wanted when he asked me, and indeed honored me by asking me to come to be his advisor on international affairs, POLAD, we call it, political advisor, to be his POLAD, was that I keep him abreast daily of developments in various parts of the world, international developments. Developments in the NATO countries, of course, first and foremost, but also developments in other parts of the world. Why? Because a number of the NATO members were former or still colonial powers who had deep interests in different parts of the world, in Africa, in the Far East, in South Asia, and had deep economic and other political interests in those areas. And what happened in those areas to their interests would obviously have an effect on their policies with respect to NATO and the United States and so forth.

So every morning, five days a week, I picked up about 7:00 o'clock in the morning at the American Embassy a batch of telegrams that had been repeated to me and a summary from the department, which I then drove out to SHAPE at Rocquencourt reading the telegrams on the way out in the car. It was about a 35-minute to 40-minute run out to the headquarters outside of Paris. And I would dictate a summary, a brief summary with one brief paragraph, perhaps not more than four or five lines for each telegram, and then I would go in and brief General Eisenhower. I met with him from 8:15 'til roughly just before 9:00 o'clock every morning.


Lire aussi :


Then I got a message saying that the President would like me to go to Belgium, where we were having some problems with Belgium as a result of developments in the Congo. I accepted that appointment with great pleasure, because as a member of General Eisenhower's staff in Normandy, Assistant Political Advisor for French Resistance Affairs, I had not only participated in the liberation of Paris, but on the eve of the liberation of Brussels by Marshal Montgomery's forces, General Eisenhower called me into his office and said--I say on the evening; it was actually about lunchtime--and said, "MacArthur, I want you to go up and see how Monty does liberating Brussels tomorrow." So I went forward. It was only a two- or three-hour drive with military escort, and participated in the liberation of Brussels, which was, to me, not as emotional as the liberation of Paris, where I'd spent years before the war, retreated before the Germans, then been in Vichy, and so forth, but it was a very emotional experience.

Then in October, I was reassigned from General Eisenhower's staff--the Brussels liberation was September 3, 1944--I was reassigned to the embassy to head up the political section in the embassy.

Q: I would like to move on to Belgium. You said you had had acquaintances with Belgium before, one with Eisenhower. You also were sent there as first secretary.

MACARTHUR: I was sent there as first secretary after I finished my tour of duty in Paris in '48. I went to Belgium as first secretary. While I was there, Paul Henri Spaak was both prime minister and foreign minister, one of the free world's great post-war statesmen. I was chargé d'affaires when Admiral Kirk was gone a considerable amount of time; that's when he was being considered for the Russian post.

Q: Admiral Kirk at that time was the American ambassador.

MACARTHUR: He was the ambassador. He had commanded the American elements of the Navy in the invasion of Normandy, the cruisers and ships that did the bombarding and preparatory work, had a very brilliant and gifted wife intellectually, Lydia Kirk, who later wrote a book or two. So I served there. As I say, I was chargé d'affaires on several occasions when he was away.

Then in May 1949, I had been there less than a year, I got word that the Secretary wanted me to become Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs.


Il est aussi très intéressant d'apprendre qu'il connaissait bien M. Pinay


MACARTHUR: I was with the Secretary, and as coordinator, I accompanied him to most of the meetings, because we also met in San Francisco with Mr. Pinay, who was the French Foreign Minister, whom I had known well in the period when I served in France just after the liberation.


Pour en revenir à la Belgique :


MACARTHUR: I found that we had some extremely capable and good people. I found it an excellent embassy. I had been chargé d'affaires for a while in Belgium, in '49, during Admiral Kirk's incumbency as ambassador when he was away, even though I was ill, and I had served in another big embassy in Paris as head of the political section, so I was somewhat familiar with embassy operations.


et à la crise katangaise :


Now, Spaak was a very sensible man, and he did not approve of certain of the things that some of the companies politically, of the Societe General, which was divided on this subject primarily because of Union Miniere, basically they wanted the Congo to be split up, because Katanga, where the heart of the mineral resources were and so forth, was where they had their operations, and that was part of the dissident rebellious part of the Congo that was trying to break away. So there were complications for Spaak and the Belgian Government of an internal domestic order, which had very important economic and political implications for the government and the party.

The situation with Spaak and the relationships--and he said it in his memoirs that he felt that I had always spoken to him with the greatest frankness about our concerns and the depth of our concerns and our basic feelings and commitments, but on the other hand, he felt that I was transmitting to Washington an accurate portrayal of his problems, too, and the kinds of dilemmas that Belgium faced in this insurrection of what to do about it.

They had withdrawn their troops, the insurrection was going on, and then the thing finally came. I won't go into all the things that happened over a three-year span, but it finally came when Lumumba seized about 2,000 foreign hostages.

Q: Was it Lumumba at that time, or had Lumumba been killed? Was it Gizenga?

MACARTHUR: Lumumba was the one that declared that Americans and Belgians were to be seized. He may have been bumped by that time, but in that period leading up to the seizure of the hostages, he had encouraged the idea.

Then as it became clear that the hostages were seized, we became concerned. Why? Because we had somewhere in the neighborhood of 100-plus or more Americans--we didn't quite know--that probably had been grabbed, missionaries, people of various kinds. So on a unilateral basis, we started some contingency planning in the Pentagon about what we would have to do to go in and grab the hostages.

Q: By the way, these hostages were in Stanleyville?

MACARTHUR: Stanleyville and Polis. There were about 1,700 in Stanleyville and about 300 in Polis.

bullocks

Stan was 24 novembre 1964 et P.Lum was shot and later cut to pieces and put in acid and burnt in oil bin on 17 janvier 1961 in Katanga by a belgian police officer S.O.e.te

Outre la longue interview de Douglas MacArthur II lui-même, d'autres personnes citent son nom.

Il suffit de faire une recherche sur

http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/

Il ne faut pas s'attendre à des révélations mais toutes les informations fiables sur Douglas MacArthur II, Michel Relecom, Betsy Heris (Management Center Europe), Alexander Haig, Lyman Lemnitzer et autres liens USA-Belgique sont bonnes à prendre ...


_ _ _


The FAOH transcripts have been uploaded free-of-charge to the Library of
Congress Web site at http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/diplomacy/

You can search by interviewee. There is at least one interview there
with MacArthur II.

Please contact ADST to determine whether they have more transcripts of
interviews with MacArthur:

Association for Diplomatic Studies, 703-302-6990. www.adst.org. Ms.
Marylin Bentley at marilyn_bentley@adst.org

http://youthfederation.org/index.php/about-us

(...)

History

Inspired by the vision of Dr. Sun Myung Moon and Hak Ja Han Moon to transcend all barriers of nationality, race, culture, and religion, young leaders from 20 countries gathered in Bejing, China, in June 1994 and called for the creation of YFWP. In July of that year, delegates from 164 nations officially launched the YFWP in Washington, D.C.

International figures have joined numerous YFWP Youth Congresses to add their strong support for the voice of youth in global peacemaking, including former U.S. President George H. W. Bush, British Prime Minister Sir Edmund Heath, President Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica, Prime Minister Aziz Sidky of Egypt, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, Dr. Stoyan Ganev (former president of the UN General Assembly), youth violence prevention movement leader Robert Woodson, leading youth cultural artists including the Kirov Ballet, and other prominent leaders from every sector of life.

(...)

_ _ _


Au sujet de

Rodrigo Carazo of Costa Rica :

http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/1995/diciembre/14/pagina05.html

Embajador honorario cuestionado

El espinoso expediente Przedborski

Un archivo de 111 folios testimonia el tumultuoso avance de Félix Przedborski en la diplomacia costarricense

Lea además:

Ilustres exigencias

Mauricio Herrera Ulloa
Redactor de La Nación


Generosas recomendaciones, nombramientos, denuncias, defensas, cargos y descargos. Todo esto abunda en el expediente personal de Félix Przedborski Chawa, embajador honorario costarricense ante la Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica (OIEA).
Przedborski también ha pedido el nombramiento de amigos, ha solicitado sus propias designaciones en Europa e impuesto al Gobierno de Costa Rica sus condiciones de trabajo.
Así está documentado en un memorando enviado por el presbítero Benjamín Núñez al entonces presidente Luis Alberto Monge, el 8 de julio de 1982.

Diversos órganos de prensa belga han sostenido que el embajador se ha valido de su condición diplomática para desarrollar en Europa una serie de dudosas actividades. La Nación pidió una entrevista con el abogado de Félix Przedborski en Costa Rica, Ricardo Castro Calvo, e incluso le envió un cuestionario, pero prefirió no responder.

Nudo europeo

En el expediente de Przedborski que guarda la Cancillería nacional, resalta una cadena de designaciones diplomáticas, algunas de ellas simultáneas. Aunque tiene una mansión en Antibes, en la costa azul francesa, en los documentos se indica que sus sitios usuales de trabajo han sido Viena, Bruselas y París.

El gobierno de Daniel Oduber Quirós (1974-1978) fue el primero en otorgarle un cargo diplomático. "Delegado permanente ante la Organización Internacional de Energía Atómica" con sede en Viena, era el puesto que le daba el acuerdo 358-SE del 20 de agosto de 1976.

Duró poco en el puesto. Según algunas versiones verbales, la administración de Rodrigo Carazo Odio (1978-1982) lo separó al inicio del gobierno, en un proceso de reorganización del Servicio Exterior, pero esto no consta en los documentos.

"En aquel momento quitamos como a 200 personas. Yo ordené que quitaran a todos de los que no se tuvieran referencias concretas", recuerda Carazo, y entre ellos estaba el polémico diplomático.

Defensa belga

En 1979 Przedborski reapareció en el cuerpo diplomático costarricense. El entonces ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, Rafael Angel Calderón Fournier, lo nombró como "encargado de asuntos turísticos en Francia", mediante el acuerdo 832-SE del 7 de setiembre de 1979.

El 31 de julio de 1980 el embajador honorario de nuevo fue cesado, mediante el acuerdo 592-SE. En su expediente no se detallan los motivos. Aunque no hubo razón aparente, de ese año datan descargos emitidos por autoridades austriacas.

"La Embajada de Austria (...) tiene el honor de informar que fueron suspendidos todos los procedimientos en contra del señor Félix Przedborski", aseguró el 28 de julio de 1980 la misión diplomática de ese país ubicada en México.

El 5 de agosto de 1981 una vehemente carta del entonces embajador de Costa Rica en Bélgica, José Luis Redondo, al canciller Bernd Niehaus, daba cuenta del escándalo que desató en la prensa de esa nación un lío financiero en Bélgica y Alemania en que participó una empresa de Przedborski.

"Dado que el señor Przedborski cuenta con amigos influyentes en la política de Costa Rica, a los cuales es posible que recurra en busca de amparo en futuras administraciones, parece ser de interés nacional que estos hechos consten en el expediente que dicho señor tiene (...) para que nadie se llame a engaño en el futuro", decía la carta.

El embajador Redondo no tuvo que esperar mucho tiempo para confirmar que Przedborski acudió a "influyentes amigos". El 8 de julio de 1982 el padre Benjamín Núñez, figura histórica del Partido Liberación Nacional, escribió al presidente Luis Alberto Monge una carta de desagravio al diplomático, donde además solicitaba condiciones y recomendaba amigos. (Véase recuadro adjunto).

La petición del padre Núñez surtió efecto con celeridad; el 14 de abril de 1983 Przedborski volvió a aparecer inscrito en el Servicio Exterior, primero en Austria y posteriormente en Bélgica.

Mediante el acuerdo 172-DVM el presidente Monge y su vicecanciller, Ekhart Peters, lo designaron representante permanente en la OIEA en Viena y lo ascendieron al rango de embajador.

Además en esa administración, en una fecha no especificada, se le nombra como consejero comercial ante la Comunidad Europea en Bruselas y consejero comercial ante la Embajada costarricense en Bélgica.

El canciller Fernando Volio manifestó al mandatario Monge sus reservas acerca de ese nombramiento. "Mi posición respecto a él no tuvo ni tiene fundamento personal. Me opuse a su nombramiento por razones institucionales. Me interesaba y me interesa levantar el prestigio del Servicio Exterior de la República, muy deteriorado por nombramientos de extranjeros ad honórem que fueron objeto de escándalo público", le escribió Volio a Monge el 31 de enero de 1983.

Francia, la difícil

Przedborski logró nuevas acreditaciones en Viena y Bruselas, y el gobierno de Oscar Arias nombró a sus esposa, Helene Krygyer, como ministra consejera honoraria en Ginebra, a partir del 28 de marzo de 1990.

Lo que nunca ha logrado es obtener un puesto en la sede de la Unesco, en París, a pesar de tres intentos de tres presidentes distintos.

En contra del usual protocolo diplomático, el Gobierno francés se opuso de manera terminante, incluso por escrito, a las solicitudes que hicieron las administraciones de Monge, Arias y Rafael Angel Claderón, aunque sin explicaciones oficiales.

Ante la insistencia costarricense Francia respondió con el más duro lenguaje diplomático. "En referencia a su nota N=CRU-670-93 del 30 de setiembre 1993 relativa a la nominación de M. Félix Przedborski, tenemos el honor de hacerle saber que esta proposición no nos parece oportuna", concluyó la sección de protocolo del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, el 9 de diciembre de ese año en la nota N°ree;1305/PRO/oi.

El gobierno de Calderón lo promovió al rango de ministro consejero ante la Comunidad Económica Europea, en la misión de Costa Rica en Bruselas, como consta en la nota ECRI 084-92 enviada por la Embajada de Costa Rica en esa capital al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores en Bélgica, el 27 de julio de 1992.

La simultaneidad de las acreditaciones acabó en 1994: el 17 de diciembre de ese año, el actual canciller, Fernando Naranjo, separó al diplomático de cualquier otro cargo que no fuera el de embajador ante la OIEA en Viena. El jefe de la misión diplomática de Costa Rica en Bélgica, Alvaro Sancho, solicitó la desinscripción oficial de Przedborski, el 20 de diciembre del año pasado.


Ilustres exigencias

En la nota del 8 de julio de 1982, el fallecido padre Benjamín Núñez, representante de Costa Rica ante la Unesco, comunicó al presidente Luis Alberto Monge la aspiración de Przedborski de contar con las siguientes distinciones:

Ministro consejero comercial de la embajada costarricense en Berna (Suiza) y ministro consejero y segundo representante alterno en la delegación de Costa Rica ante la Unesco en París.

Para cada uno de esos puestos demandaba 4 pasaportes diplomáticos, para él, su esposa y sus dos hijos mayores de 18 años, a pesar de que las normas de Cancillería de ese momento especificaban que solo los menores de edad podrían disfrutar del beneficio del pasaporte.

Solicitaba también puestos para amigos suyos en Zurich (Suiza) y en Antibes, en la Costa Azul de Francia, donde Przedborski tiene una lujosa residencia.

° °

Félix Przedborski, actual embajador honorario de Costa Rica ante la Organización Internacional de la Energía Atómica, será separado de su cargo cuando, la próxima semana, la comisión del Servicio Exterior anuncie el recorte de todos los diplomáticos honorarios que sirven al país.

Texto completo de la sentencia en primera instancia absolutoria del periodista Mauricio Herrera

_______________________


Voir aussi :

http://wvw.nacion.com/ln_ee/ESPECIALES/sentencia.html

et

http://www.scribd.com/doc/78850856/Icr-24-4-Costa-Rica

Sur l'anti-communisme de Douglas MacArthur II :

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:1:./temp/~ammem_ZDmY::


Interview with John Sylvester Jr.

(...)

SYLVESTER: No, I never did. I think it lingered on in the older people. But by the time I entered the Foreign Service, '55, McCarthy was dead and it was changing. It was, however, a conservative period in the United States. Anti-Communism was still the principal motif of our foreign policy. And you could see that in the way that Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II carried out his embassy in Japan in those years.

(...)

Interview with Henry Byroade

(...)

Q: The Soviet military strength, the conventional strength, we were not so worried about because we did have a monopoly on the atomic bomb up until the fall of 1949; isn't that true?

BYROADE: Well, true, except it was certainly obvious that it was just a matter of time until the Russians got a useable bomb. I can't pinpoint any date, or any conference, that this came to a head.

Q: That was a concern, no doubt. Achilles goes on to say that a group, including you, Harriman, General Gruenther, Douglas MacArthur II, Ambassador [Charles] Spofford, as well as Achilles, met in Achilles' home, and you "concocted a simple scheme," to obtain Allied support for rearming Germany.

(...)

Q: Achilles, by the way, describes Douglas MacArthur II, who was political advisor to Eisenhower in 1950-51, as a "hard-boiled realist, and rather a political opportunist." How do you remember him?

BYROADE: Well, Doug was in charge of regional affairs for the State Department in European Affairs, and we were thrown so closely together because I was in charge of German Affairs, and I couldn't see any good answers to the German problem except in the regional context. So we worked together on everything that had to do with the regional advancement of Europe. Doug and I were extremely close at that time. He was a very capable operator. We drifted apart a bit later on; I didn't like too well the way I thought Doug ran his embassies.

Q: He was Ambassador later on?

BYROADE: He was Ambassador to Japan, and somewhere else, I think.

Q: That must have confused the Japanese a little bit didn't it? Perhaps he was a hard-boiled realist. I get the impression he was rather strongly in favor of getting West Germany into NATO, or into some kind of rearmament.

BYROADE: That's true, but he wanted to do it in the European context as much as I did.

(...)

Interview with Wendell W. Woodbury

(...)

After the occupation ended we showed our finesse by sending out a Foreign Service officer by the name of Douglas MacArthur II; I think that was about the dumbest thing we have ever done. Many of my friends told me he was a terrible man to work for and his wife was even worse. So after them, Reischauer and Mrs. Reischauer seemed like saints. Everybody liked them, in fact he was almost revered, especially by the language officers.

MacArthur II, while unlovable was such a strong man that he made the American ambassador The President's representative in Japan rather than the commander of U.S. Forces, Far East. We still operated pre-Reischauer pretty much as if there was a senior/junior relationship.

(...)

Interview with Edgar J. Beigel

(...)

When the 1950 reorganization was put into play they were invited to ask for people by name if they had favorites they worked with and they wanted to see transferred into the geographic bureaus. I was on the list for the Office of Western European Affairs which was temporarily headed at that time by Douglas MacArthur II. But soon he went up to create a new office to backstop the NATO activity and Ted Achilles came on as director of the Western European Office.

(...)


Cela montre l'implication précoce de Douglas MacArthur II dans l'OTAN.

Interview with Charles A. Mast

(...)

MAST: I was in Tehran until the summer of 1972, when I went to Tabriz, in northwestern Iran, as American consul, and I was there until the summer of 1974.

Q: Well, let's stick to Teheran first. Who was our ambassador when you got out there?

MAST: When I got there, Douglas MacArthur II.

Q: He had a reputation of being rather imperious, but also a reaprofessional - but rather demanding. How did you find him?

MAST: Well, he was clearly very professional in his dress and his demeanor and the way he approached problems. I found him imperious. I am sure he didn't know my name. There's no question about that, even though I was control officer occasionally for a senator or someone, and we'd be in his office and he'd be briefing the person. But I was one of his younger officers. As a junior officer, that's what we accepted in those days. Although I do remember one thing in retrospect, after what happened to the Shah. Ambassador MacArthur was briefing Dewey Bartlett, who had been governor of Oklahoma and was going to be running for the Senate. And I can still hear Ambassador MacArthur talking about "in the great arc that extends from Japan to Turkey, there is only one Island of stability, and that is Iran." That was 1972, so he certainly didn't foresee the future very well.

(...)

But after Douglas MacArthur II, who as I said never knew my name - I think I was invited maybe once or twice to the residence,

(...)

Interview with Roger C. Brewin

(...)

Q: Did you feel any constraints in your reporting?

BREWIN: Not in my section. I think the political section was constrained; there is no question about that. They were constrained about reporting on human rights violations, on the opposition to the Shah. I think that constraint was present going back even to 1953 when we put the Shah back on his throne. Some Ambassadors were far more vehement on this subject than others--Douglas MacArthur II, for example, would tolerate no criticism of the Shah in the post's reporting whatsoever.

(...)

Interview with Robert L. Chatten

(...)

Our Japan days saw the transition to the New Frontier. Kennedy had been elected but Eisenhower was still in office when we went. MacArthur was replaced by Edmund Oldfather Reischauer, a Japan scholar born in Japan of missionary parents, and fluent Japanese speaker, about whom some of the people in USIS Tokyo thought, "He'd be a good CAO." It was a yeasty period in Japanese-American relations because the nature of the relationship was changing dramatically, with the change further dramatized by these two very, very different characters of Douglas MacArthur II the nephew of the General and married to Vice President Alben Barkley's daughter, and Ed Reischauer, married to the granddaughter of a former Prime Minister of Japan.

(...)

Sur la Belgique et le Congo ...

Interview with Robert M. Beaudry

(...)

Q: Then you left Washington and went to Brussels where you served from 1963-66. What were you doing there?

BEAUDRY: I was head of the political section. In the course of time in this Office of Swiss-Benelux, as economic officer I was number two. I covered all the countries and the only one other than the guy who ran the office, Galen Stone. Then Galen moved up as a deputy in Western Europe and I sort of moved up to be the director, or whatever, and still carried the economic job. So I got to know MacArthur when he came through.

Q: This is Douglas MacArthur II.

BEAUDRY: He was moving from Tokyo to Brussels as Ambassador. I was his den mother in the Department for the transfer. Not that he needed one and not that he was around much. He spent most of his time on the Hill explaining to the Members of Congress why he had recommended the cancellation of President Eisenhower's trip to Tokyo. But we established a working relationship.

Then Margaret Tibbetts, who was head of the political section was selected for senior training and so that job came open. One distinguished citizen turned it down because he would rather not work in that atmosphere.

Q: Douglas MacArthur was known as a difficult man to work for.

BEAUDRY: Yes, with a difficult wife.

Q: With a very difficult wife.

BEAUDRY: I was ambitious at the time so I agreed to go. I also had a thing that I found was very valuable with MacArthur. I had been in the Department then over three years and knew everybody. I could call people. That was very important to MacArthur. I could tell him when something would come up..."Well, the Under Secretary thinks such and such because I talked to so and so." And that helped. That made my time with him.

The big thing we had then in our relations with the Belgians, was the Congo (Zaire). When I came back in 1959 to take on the job, the Congo had blown up and they were giving it independence in June or July, 1960. The Department selected Clare Timberlake to be the first Ambassador. So he was in for briefings. Well, all of Francophone Africa was covered by two men in the Department. This extensive territory, increasingly complex and it had no support in the Department. AF just didn't have any people. So I ended up doing a lot of the briefing because at least from the economic side and from the Belgian political side, I was more knowledgeable. We were always part of the task force in the Department working on the Congo.

The other man in this in the very beginning was Bob Miller, the Belgian political desk officer. He and I were on these task forces, he more than I as time went on.When I got to Brussels the Congo was still a major issue.

But then we had things like the nuclear relationship in the Alliance. Remember the MLF, the multilateral nuclear force? Those were the kinds of issues we had. We didn't have any direct bilateral problems. We were slightly concerned whether Belgium might fragment because the Flemings and Walloons were very much head to head. Now they have worked it out where they have devolved all kinds of political power at lower levels. I would really have trouble grasping where they are today, but in those days it was the Flemings and the Walloons. And it created an instability in the government and we didn't want that in NATO. Again, it wasn't an issue that kept us up nights.

If the Socialists were in or out of the government, or the Christian Democrats, that didn't really bother us either. They were both very pro-NATO and pro-European, etc.So the big problem was the Congo and we ended up by mounting that rescue mission. This was quite interesting because all we did was provide transportation. The Belgians provided a 500-man combat battalion of paratroopers and we dropped them over Stanleyville. In a way it was a marker for other people in Africa that even though you weren't on the coast, the 20th century gunboats could get you if you weren't careful.

It was done at the behest, pretty largely, of Averell Harriman. MacArthur had been in Washington when they decided to do it. A number of people quailed a little bit when the explosion took place at the UN over this because there was outrage on the part of the Third World. Yet we ran the second one. We had about four or five rescue missions planned.

Q: Basically these were rebel units that were threatening a group of Europeans, including some Americans at the Consulate at Stanleyville.

BEAUDRY: Yes. There were 40 or 50 Europeans who were about to be slaughtered, we understood. It was a rebellion against the central government.

Q: Massambas, I think they were called.

BEAUDRY: That is right and they had this mystical thing that they were impervious to bullets. They got that way because none of the local constabulary could shoot.

(...)

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/D?mfdip:13:./temp/~ammem_DadS::

Interview with Arthur F. Blaser Jr.

(...)

BLASER: Yes, that's right. I don't want to over-stress that, but Ambassador MacArthur was a very aggressive, hard driving individual, who knew what he wanted to do, and it often worked out that way. And I think he was maybe a little bit insensitive to the point you just suggested.

(...)

Interview with Sheldon Vance

(...)

VANCE: There certainly were differences. The battles were long and all but bloody. Our then ambassador to Brussels was Douglas MacArthur II, and he bombarded the Department with two- and three-section telegrams containing the advice and points of view of the Belgian Government which differed very sharply from ours, especially in the way that we were badgering that great conservative statesman Moise Tshombe.

The European Bureau spokesman was Bill Burdett, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, and had been assigned the Congo problem by his assistant secretary. Then the Office of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, known in the Department as IO at the time, was very pleased with what was going on in the Congo, because the U.N. was, in effect, managing the Congo with its experts and maintaining law and order with its troops.

(...)

Ed Gullion, who was our ambassador at the time in Leopoldville, was strongly supportive. We and he saw eye to eye on what should be done and what shouldn't be done. As I say, Ambassador MacArthur usually differed.

(...)

Interview with Thomas R. Hutson

(...)

Q: Tell us a little about your tour as staff assistant to Douglas MacArthur and say something about Mrs. MacArthur.

HUTSON: Douglas MacArthur II was the nephew of the General. He was a career Foreign Service officer. He graduated from Yale. He was a diminutive man with steely blue eyes with a deep voice. People were terrified to work for him. They were even more terrified of "Wahwee" - Mrs. MacArthur. She was the daughter of Vice-President Allen Barcley. Her given name was really Laura, but had picked up the name "Wahwee" somewhere along the line.

I worshiped the ambassador. He was the best. I have worked for many fine ambassadors, but he was the best. When you worked directly for MacArthur, you became a member of the family. I lived through the ambassador's very serious bout of pneumonia and an assassination attempt which was kept secret for over a year. That was the beginning of terrorism in Iran which eventually led to the revolution. There was no question in anyone's mind that he was the ambassador. He had a speech about the Persian Gulf situation which emphasized the importance of the region's oil to the industrialized western world. He believed that repetition was the "mother of learning" when it came to dealing with Washington. Of course, in those days, cables were the usual method of communication; phone calls were rare and not always reliable. So he would constantly bombard the Department pointing out the importance of the issues and the Shah's vital role in maintaining our role in the Gulf. I thought MacArthur was extremely effective; he worked well with all elements of the U.S. representation in Iran. For example, there was no doubt that he was completely abreast of the CIA's operations in Iran; the station was well staffed, but all knew who the "leader" was. That went for the military as well; he was the boss there as well. He was a tough professional, but effective.

He had a very human side as well. I remember that at one time, there was a young boy who attended the American School who was killed in some kind of accident. He didn't know the family at all, but he wept openly when he got the news. I was really startled. He had the reputation of being a very tough leader, but he was so moved by this event that he just broke down.

MacArthur was a great bird hunter. My guess is that he got involved in that when he was our ambassador in Brussels and Vienna. He undoubtedly had a lot of hunting friends there; he would join them on their hunting expeditions. He brought a group of them to Tehran one time. That reminds me of a story which I call "Protocol and the Pig-Sty." The hunt was held on the grounds of an Armenian family where pigs were raised and pork and wine was manufactured on very good hunting grounds. The owners were friends of the ambassador. The family arranged to have a lunch for the guests - in the middle of a pig farm filled of course with droppings. Tables were brought out and nicely decorated, but the pigs' droppings were everywhere. The smell was overwhelming. I could not - and others could not - understand why this spot was chosen for the lunch. I guess the hosts preferred a "rustic" location. I remember that everything was proceeding smoothly despite the farm aura. At one point, Mrs. MacArthur called me over. She asked :"Tom, do you love your wife?" I knew the theater group involved an interesting group of women, but it seemed a very strange question. I said, "Of course, I do." Then Mrs. MacArthur said, "I am glad to hear that because she is not doing your career any good!" Then "Wahwee" noted that my wife had gotten in the food catering line ahead of Mrs. Lehfeldt, the wife of the economic counselor. They two were chatting and my wife, I am surely entirely inadvertently, had gotten ahead of Mrs. Lehfeldt - out of protocol order! I should note that Mrs. MacArthur had helped to write our own local protocol manual and so she was fully aware of all of it picky requirements. The point that Mrs. MacArthur made caught me entirely by surprise and I didn't know whether to laugh or cry. I was very upset with Wahwee, but I was wise enough not to respond and the episode passed without any further notice.

Wahwee would not let local-hire staff into the residence to attend social functions there. That was appalling because most officers really needed translators since few spoke Farsi. When we had an event one of the embassy's substantive sections would send a suggested guest list. I would screen it as did our Iranian social secretary. The final word was of course the ambassador's. He would take it home, let Wahwee review it and then he brought it back and invitations were issued. I remember at one time, near the end of his tour, that Bill Lehfeldt was trying to get some of his local employees in the commercial section invited. He needed their help and would have added immeasurably to their status in the Iranian community. I reviewed his proposed list and didn't touch the FSNs on the list. I sent the list to Mrs. MacArthur. Much to our surprise, the list came back with the FSNs still on it. We all thought we had made a breakthrough. The night of the event, as I was standing just before the receiving line, making the introductions, Mrs. MacArthur came up to me and said: "Tom, what are these local employees doing here?" I told her they had been on the list that she had approved. She then said: "Tom, in the future... Oh, I guess, you don't have much of a future in the Foreign Service!"

I should at this stage mention that Mrs. MacArthur was very nice to me at a later stage in my career. After the MacArthurs retired in Brussels, in part to be with their daughter who had married a Belgian, I had a chance to meet them again. I was traveling in Europe trying to find other employment - I was thinking of leaving the Foreign Service. I sent them a message that I would be in Brussels and would like to call on them. I really did worship him. I got a very warm response inviting me to stay with them. When I arrived, Mrs. MacArthur met me at the airport driving their old Mercedes by herself. She took me to their lovely apartment. They had kept the Filipino housemaid that they had had for many years and who stayed with him until his death. The MacArthurs could not have been warmer, although I did detect a second agenda. At the time, I was the consul general in Winnipeg working for Ambassador Thomas O. Enders. He had been the DCM in Belgrade for Ambassador William Leonhart. Leonhart had been MacArthur's second DCM in Tokyo. Leonhart had fired Enders, which in turn resulted in Leonhart's removal. The MacArthurs wanted to know all of the"dirt" surrounding this feud. I have never worked for a smarter man than Tom Enders; he was a very effective ambassador. Fortunately, I got along very well with Enders - many did not. So I had nothing but praise for the Enders. I think that disappointed the MacArthurs.

After Mrs. MacArthur died, I had lunch with the ambassador. That was the second time I saw him weep. This was about six weeks after her death and he was still very much in shock.

Being staff aide was a seven-days-per-week job. It was morning, noon and night. As I mentioned, I participated in theater activities while MacArthur's staff aide. In fact, I was the president of the International Theater of Tehran. It became a major enterprise; so I was busy acting, running the business end of the productions, etc. My wife began to wonder where I spent my time; I didn't have much time to be home. Douglas MacArthur, despite his demanding ways, was an effective manager; he knew what the objectives of his mission were. We encountered one major personnel flap and that was the result of the Vietnam war. It had a terrible impact on a very fine Foreign Service officer, Ernest Thomas Greene who was the consul in Tabriz. I really looked up to him; he was a Persian scholar; he was a superb manager who ran a very effective post. He had a British wife whose ancestors had been in the British diplomatic or colonial service. Tom had an employee, Murray C. Smith, who was leading protests within the Foreign Service against our involvement in Vietnam. Tom got caught in the middle and was burned by it. That was really sad.

I was not in the Service long enough to know how to stop the forces that eventually railroaded Smith out of the Service. When he took his grievance to court, the anvil fell on Tom Greene because he was Smith's immediate supervisor. I think Doug Heck was the DCM at the time; he was a very decent human being; I think he did everything he could to prevent the final outcomes. Iran was one of the reasons I resigned from the Foreign Service in 1980. I think we made a big mistake in turning our back on the Shah; that was not what I consider a valid American policy. The Shah was our friend and Americans don't turn their backs on friends.

Q: What did you think MacArthur's attitude was toward the Shah and the ruling clique?

HUTSON: He related well with them socially. There is a wonderful book written about this period in U.S.-Iran relations by a former Fulbright scholar, James Bill; he was at William and Mary where until recently ran the Reeves International Center - he is now retired. He had the permission of the Department - a rare occurrence - to work in the embassy; he had access to all of our material and information. The book, "The Eagle and the Lion", describes how decisions were made.

(...)

Un article du "Pourquoi Pas ?" du 15 mai 1964 sur l'ambassadeur Douglas MacArthur II est sur :

http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/82166121/Article-sur-MacArthur-II-1964

A noter que ma "Pourquoi Pas ?" était lié au groupe Josi et que Jean Josi était un bon ami de Paul Vanden Boeynants (toujours impliqué dans les foires du Heysel) et de Douglas MacArthur II pour lesquels il a servi de facteur :

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81586870/Lettre-de-Paul-Vanden-Boeynants-a-Douglas-MacArthur-II

http://www.scribd.com/doc/81587520/Reponse-de-Douglas-MacArthur-II-a-Paul-Vanden-Boeynants

http://memory.loc.gov

Interview with Ulrich A. Straus

(...)

Q: What was your impression of the Embassy? At that time Douglas MacArthur II, a career Foreign Service officer and nephew of the General, was Ambassador.

STRAUS: Yes, he was.

I was in Japan in 1955 when he was appointed and I thought that it was a big mistake to appoint anyone with that name. But the Japanese saw it differently. He had been the Counselor in the Department, a man who obviously had the ear of the Secretary of State, one of the high and mighty and the Japanese were flattered to get an important person like that.

However, I found the Embassy was not a very happy place. In fact, compared to all the others places I have been subsequently, it was a very unhappy place. I remember one incident, for example, this was a time of turmoil in the spring of 1960 with a lot of demonstrations going on...[second side of first tape]

Q: You were saying that you sat in on a meeting with Douglas MacArthur.

STRAUS: Yes, indeed. The Ambassador held forth for all but a minute of this 50 minute interview where he tried to persuade the president of a prominent university that these demonstrations against the security treaty, against Kishi, the Prime Minister at the time, were all wrong. And that it was his Christian duty, as it were, to oppose this kind of thing. At the end of that 50 minutes, he was rather summarily dismissed and thanked for contributing his views, which the man never had the chance to do. I think that was kind of the way MacArthur ran things.

At a later point we were asked our thoughts about the Eisenhower Presidential visit and it was clear to everybody, at least below the DCM level, that it needed to be postponed. But at that point I think the Ambassador's ego was involved in the visit and he wanted to continue it until finally the Japanese indicated that they were concerned about the safety of the Emperor as much as anything. Protocol demanded that the Emperor go out to the airport. So at their insistence it was postponed.

Q: These demonstrations were over a security treaty we were developing with the Japanese.

(...)

http://memory.loc.gov/

Interview with Jack A. Sulser

(...)

In due course we heard lots of stories about him and his wife, one of them from the wife of the British ambassador in Austria, who had been the British ambassador in the Philippines when MacArthur was ambassador to Japan. This good woman told my wife at a British Embassy party that they were saddened to hear that they were going to be in contact with the MacArthurs again, because when they were out there in the Pacific the Ocean was not big enough for the two of them even though they were not in the same country. People tell stories about the MacArthurs much more freely than I would expect. Much more freely than normal gossip.

Q: Well how did he operate and what were the problems?

SULSER: He was ambassador in Belgium when he was named to Austria. He had no background in the area, no knowledge of German. When we got a message from him about his arrival, they were taking the train from Brussels to Salzburg but wanted the Ambassador's car and driver to meet them in Salzburg instead of going all the way to Vienna on the train. The Ambassador's car was to be equipped permanently with a cooler to be kept stocked with a certain brand of champagne for Mrs. MacArthur. The cooler was to be maintained in the car, supplied with this brand of champagne at all times. When she was calling on foreign ambassador's wives or cabinet members' wives or going shopping or whatever, this brand of champagne was to be available in the car.

After they got established, she would occasionally have Embassy wives in for coffee. Coffee and orange juice and so on would be served to the wives, except Mrs. MacArthur who drank only this champagne.

As far as how he operated, with Riddleberger the regular Embassy staff meetings were such as I have experienced at other posts, where you go around the table and each one says what he is doing or what he is about to do, and the ambassador comments, gives guidance, reacts, whatever, to these things. The ambassador might also have something to say. But with MacArthur it was very different. We still had the regular weekly staff meetings, with most of the American staff there, but they were all lectures. He did all the talking. It would be based on information telegrams from the Department. Based on his experience as counselor of the Department, ambassador in Japan, ambassador in Belgium, he had a very wide-ranging experience, and he would educate us about the significance and implications of what was going on around the world. By the time he would finish his lecture it was already overtime and hardly ever was it necessary for anybody to say what he was doing yesterday or today or planning to do tomorrow as far as U.S. activities in Austria were concerned.

Another request of a personal nature he made when he arrived, he wanted to be outfitted with a proper hunting costume. This was one of his interests. He wanted to go hunting chamois in the Austrian mountains. I knew the largest clothing manufacturer in Austria socially, and we were very friendly with them. So I said, well I can take care of that, this factory manufactures every kind of clothing. I arranged for the Ambassador to go to the head of this firm and be measured for a proper Gamsjaeger outfit, which had to be in certain traditional colors. He got that done.

Since he did not speak German, when he would make his calls on Austrian officials, Ken Sullivan and I (the two best German-speakers in the Embassy) would alternate going with him on his calls. In my case, since I only overlapped with him for six weeks, was not very many. Ken was there at least a year, so he had a great deal more of that duty to do. It was a very different sort of atmosphere, a different relationship. He was much more formal than Riddleberger, much less approachable. He was even a little bit formidable. Not as much fun to work for. But my experience with him was brief and I was not very unhappy about that.

(...)