Douglas MacArthur II

http://www.nndb.com/people/136/000120773/

Douglas MacArthur II

Born: 5-Jul-1909
Birthplace: Bryn Mawr, PA
Died: 15-Nov-1997
Location of death: Washington, DC
Cause of death: Heart Failure

Gender: Male
Race or Ethnicity: White
Sexual orientation: Straight
Occupation: Diplomat
Nationality: United States
Executive summary: Career US Ambassador
Military service: US Army (1933-35)

Interned during the Second World War in France and Germany, November 1942 to February 1944. Negotiated the security treaty between the United States and Japan in 1960. Made a Career Ambassador in 1964. Evaded a kidnapping attempt by the MEK while Ambassador to Iran in November 1971.

Father: Arthur MacArthur III (brother of Douglas MacArthur)
Mother: Mary Hendry McCalla
Wife: Laura Louise Barkley ("Wahwee", dau. Alben W. Barkley, m. 21-Aug-1934)



University: BA, Yale University (1932)

US Ambassador to Iran (1969-72)
US Ambassador to Austria (1967-69)
US Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs (1965-67)
US Ambassador to Belgium (1961-65)
US Ambassador to Japan (1957-61)
Counselor of the Department of State (1953-56)
US State Department Vice Consul, Paris, France (1944-47)
US State Department 3rd Secretary, Vichy (1940-42)
US State Department Vice Consul, Naples, Italy (1937-38)
US State Department Vice Consul, Vancouver, Canada (1935)
Council on Foreign Relations
The Washington Times Editorial Advisory Board (1982-?)
Stroke 1997


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http://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/world/douglas-macarthur-2d-88-former-ambassador-to-japan.html?scp=4&sq=Douglas%20MacArthur%20II&st=cse

Douglas MacArthur 2d, 88, Former Ambassador to Japan

By ERIC PACE

Published: November 17, 1997

Douglas MacArthur 2d, a diplomat who was Ambassador to Japan from 1957 to 1961, a period when relations between Tokyo and Washington were put on a new footing of equality after 15 years of Japanese subordination, died on Saturday at Georgetown University Hospital in Washington. He was 88 and lived in Washington.

Mr. MacArthur was a nephew of Gen. Douglas MacArthur, who became the commander of the Allied occupation of Japan immediately after World War II.

After his time in Tokyo, Mr. MacArthur went on to become Ambassador to Belgium, Assistant Secretary of State for congressional relations, Ambassador to Austria and then Ambassador to Iran. There, he escaped an attempted kidnapping. He retired in 1972.

While he was Ambassador to Japan, he played a crucial role in prolonged negotiations during which Japanese grievances were addressed. Eventually, a new United States-Japanese mutual security treaty was signed and ratified by both Governments and went into effect in 1960. In that year, Time magazine called him ''the principal architect of present-day U.S. policy toward Japan.''

Despite the improvement in Japanese-American relations, there were leftist-led demonstrations against the treaty in May and June 1960, and they led to the cancellation of a scheduled visit to Japan by President Dwight D. Eisenhower. But afterward, the political party that accepted the pact was returned to power in the Japanese Parliament.

While the uproar dwindled, Premier Hayato Ikeda, on becoming head of the Japanese Government, declared that no unsolved problems remained between the Washington and Tokyo. At the time, his statement was called a signal that the postwar transitional era in relations between the two countries had come to an end, and it was said that most of the remaining problems that had emerged since the war's end had either been done away with or cut down to manageable dimensions.

Late in the transitional era, there had been strong dissatisfaction, within the emerging postwar Japan about what were seen as limitations on its sovereignty.

Years later, in 1974, it was reported from Tokyo that authoritative Japanese sources had revealed that a secret agreement allowing the United States to move nuclear weaponry through Japan had been reached in 1960 by Mr. MacArthur and Aiichiro Fujiyama, the Japanese Foreign Minister at the time. But Mr. MacArthur, who was a businessman in Belgium in 1974, and the Japanese Foreign Ministry denied the report.

Afterward Mr. MacArthur was Ambassador to Belgium from 1961 to 1965, Assistant Secretary of State from 1965 to 1967, Ambassador to Austria from 1967 to 1969, and Ambassador to Iran from 1969 to 1972.

He was born in Bryn Mawr, Pa., to Arthur MacArthur and the former Mary Hendry McCalla and went on to graduate from Milton Academy in Milton, Mass., and in 1932 from Yale. He served as an Army officer and then began his Foreign Service career in 1935 and was given a post in Vancouver, Canada.

After a succession of postings in Europe, he was assigned, during the Nazi occupation of France, to Marshall Henri Philippe Petain's puppet capital at Vichy in central France. When the Vichy Government broke off relations with the United States in 1942, he was turned over to the Nazis and was interned for 16 months.

The former Vichy Ambassador to the United States met Mr. MacArthur in Lisbon after he was freed, and remarked that he had lost weight in confinement. Mr. MacArthur answered, ''You would probably have lost weight yourself, sir, if we had handed you over to the Japanese.''

Rising in the diplomatic world, Mr. MacArthur became chief of the State Department's Divison of Western European Affairs in 1949 and was Counselor of the State Department before becoming Ambassador to Japan.

His wife of 53 years, the former Laura Louise Barkley -- daughter of Alben W. Barkley, Vice President in the Truman Administration -- died in 1987.

Mr. MacArthur's survivors include a daughter, Laura MacArthur, who lives in Belgium; two grandchildren and two great-grandchildren.

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http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/opinion/11iht-oldjune11.html?scp=1&sq=%22Douglas+MacArthur+II%22&st=nyt

1960 Hagerty Held by Airport Mob

TOKYO A screaming mob of Japanese Leftists — most of them students — attacked a limousine carrying White House press secretary James C. Hagerty and American Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II today [June 10] and held them prisoner for more than an hour before a United States Marine pilot rescued them in a helicopter. Despite attacks at Haneda International Airport and demonstrations by additional thousands in front of the American Embassy, Mr. Hagerty said afterward that the visit here of President Eisenhower on June 19 would be carried out as planned.

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http://www.time.com/time/covers/0,16641,19600627,00.html

Pour information, une très brève interview :

http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8652937298467479427#

After 37'35"

"The prince (Alexander de Rethy) worked in the former colony for a firm part of the group of Michel Relecom, head of the brewery group Unibra, and at that moment one of the biggest Belgian private investors in Zaire. Unibra, that was controlled by the friends of VdB [Paul Vanden Boeynants], owned a peculiar firm, the European Institute of Management (EIM) , an innocent sounding name behind which a private intelligence agency was hidden."

"The database irrefutably shows that the ARI maintained direct contact and carried out assignments for the American Embassy in Brussels and the Belgian branch of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). ..."An old acquaintance on the list of clients of ARI is the Saudi secret service agent Faez El Ajjazwho gave himself out as a journalist. In the databank Bouhouche and Beijer link him to theVernaillen affair (the attempted assassination on the gendarme major Herman Vernaillen), theWNP and the European Institute of Management. ...

"Still other customers of ARI were recommended by former-gendarme colonel Rene Mayerus,director of the European Institute of Management, also a private intelligence service, with a seat directly across the American Embassy on the Brussels Kunstlaan. Chairman of EIM was the former American ambassador in Brussels, Douglas MacArthur II, the son of the famous general from the second world war. Owner of EIM was the late Michel Relecom, businessman withinterests in Zaire, confidante of president Mobutu and chairman of the Belgian-AfricanChamber of Commerce. At the time, EIM had several contracts with the government of Zaire. In Belgium, thanks to Mayerus, one of the contracts the peculiar firm received was from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the security of diplomatic gatherings and high

(...)

http://www.findagrave.com/cgi-bin/fg.cgi?page=gr&GRid=35076543

Birth: Jul. 4, 1909
Bryn Mawr
Montgomery County
Pennsylvania, USA

Death: Nov. 15, 1997
Washington
District of Columbia
Maryland, USA

Douglas MacArthur II, was a member of the Yale College Class of 1932, and a member of Wolf's Head Society. His long Foreign Service career included tours as ambassadors to four nations. The nephew and namesake of the famous five-star Army general, MacArthur joined the State Department's foreign service in 1935. He was named a career ambassador, highest rank in the service, in 1966 and retired in 1972 after three years as United States ambassador to Iran where he escaped a kidnap attempt in 1970. He held the rank of department counselor from 1953 to 1956 during the Eisenhower administration, coordinating international conferences and working on the Austrian state treaty. He was principal U.S. negotiator of the treaty that established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. He was assistant secretary of state for congressional relations from 1965 to 1967, during the Johnson administration. He was ambassador to Japan from 1956 to 1961 and also headed the U.S. missions to Belgium and Austria. He played an instrumental role in the Summit Council for World Peace and a key role in the formulation of the Summit Council's International Commission for the Reunification of Korea. Survivors include a daughter, two grandchildren and two great-grandchildren. He died at Georgetown University Hospital at age 88 after a stroke and heart attack.

_ _ _


Cela vaut la peine de s'intéresser à ses liens avec la secte Moon (au passage, on verra que le général Haig avait aussi des liens avec Moon).

Extrait du site "apologétique" suivant :

http://www.unification.net/french/life/oeuvre3.html

La coopération entre les nations

Depuis 1945, l'un des obstacles à la paix internationale a été l'existence du communisme athée. Le marxisme-léninisme est fondé sur l'accusation selon laquelle les nations chrétiennes prospères n'ont pas l'intention sincère de réaliser la justice sociale. Pour relever le défi du communisme, le Révérend Moon a lancé des programmes éducatifs dans le monde entier.

L'association CAUSA International, créée en 1980, met en évidence les erreurs idéologiques et les pratiques du marxisme-léninisme et présente une contre-proposition efficace à partir d'une perspective morale théiste. CAUSA a joué un rôle crucial pour faire reculer le communisme dans le monde et provoquer sa chute finale en Europe de l'Est et dans l'ex-Union soviétique.

Le Révérend Moon a initié le Summit Council for World Peace (composé d'anciens chefs d'État et de gouvernement de tous pays) et, une fois réglé le problème du communisme, la Fédération pour la Paix Mondiale. Ces organisations servent de forum à d'éminents responsables internationaux pour contribuer à résoudre des problèmes aussi complexes que le développement du Tiers-Monde, la démocratisation de l'Europe de l'Est, l'épidémie du Sida, la réunification de la Corée, l'avenir de la démocratie, etc.

Commentant ces activités, l'ambassadeur Douglas MacArthur II a fait remarquer :

"Il y a quarante ans, mon oncle, le général Douglas MacArthur, a déclaré que le problème fondamental qui se poserait à nous dans la seconde moitié du vingtième siècle serait d'ordre religieux et qu'il nécessiterait la renaissance spirituelle de l'humanité. Pour lui, si l'humanité ne se levait pas pour affronter cette épreuve, alors Harmagueddôn serait à nos portes.

Au fil des années, j'ai été fasciné par la vie du Révérend Moon, consacrée non seulement à l'aspect doctrinal et théologique de la religion, mais aussi à des activités pratiques touchant à la renaissance de l'esprit de l'homme. Il sait nous redonner espoir, sans utiliser de méthodes autoritaires, en proposant des projets qui sont autant d'applications pratiques de la coopération de la fraternité et de l'unité."

"Nous devons travailler ensemble en tant que nations de telle sorte que l'on dise de nous : ils ont préparé un monde futur qui a compensé par sa justice les souffrances du passé. Cela doit être le but de la Fédération Internationale pour le Paix Mondiale." Général Alexander HAIG, ancien Secrétaire d'Etat américain.

Des médias libres et responsables

Les moyens de communication jouent un rôle vital dans le monde d'aujourd'hui. Leur tâche principale est d'informer le public d'une manière objective. Malheureusement, les médias sont trop souvent un instrument de distorsion des valeurs, de sensationalisme à bon marché, de propagande politique et de désinformation.

La Conférence Mondiale des Médias, qui se tient chaque année, amène des journalistes à réfléchir sur le rôle des médias pour résoudre les conflits et promouvoir la compréhension mutuelle. Elle souligne la responsabilité des médias de couvrir les affaires mondiales de la façon la plus objective et la plus honnête possible.

Les quotidiens Segye Ilbo à Séoul, Sekai Nippo à Tokyo, The Washington Times à Washington, Noticias del Mundo à New-York et à Los Angeles, The Middle East Times en Grèce et Ultimas Noticias en Uruguay ainsi que l'hebdomadaire Insight et le mensuel The World & I à Washington, ont été créés par le Révérend Moon pour servir et informer le public en respectant la vérité et l'objectivité.

(...)

Note : Arnaud de Borchgrave a collaboré au Washington Times

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arnaud_de_Borchgrave

A lire aussi :

http://www.tparents.org/library/unification/books/tims1/Tims1-71.htm

Un extrait du livre suivant (je suis intéressé par la photo dont on parle au dernier paragraphe) :

Religion, mobilization, and social action

Par Anson D. Shupe, Bronislaw Misztal

(…) The symbolism of July 28, 1994, was everything to the Unificationists, because July 28, 1993, was the date when Mrs. Moon spoke to various congresspersons, aides, and staffers in the Everett Dirksen Senate Office Building in Washington, D.C. Her husband sat in the front row, along with host Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-UT) and a number of other political dignitaries (Unification news, 1994). Thus, Parents Day 1994 was actually a holiday honoring the earlier event involving the Moons (Shupe, 1994b).

Burton then promoted a bill, House Joint Resolution 398, to make July 28 a recurring, that is, annual day of recognition for parents, that is, for the Moons (Shupe, 1994c). To become such, the resolution had to pass through both the House of representatives and the Senate. It was enacted the following October.

Why Burton ? Perhaps Moon called in his chits for past junkets lavished on politicians like Burton. Lobbyists have done so from time immemorial in Washington. Perhaps Burton also reasoned that most constituents, evangelical or otherwise, would never learn about House Joint Resolution 398 or its significance to the Unificationist movement, so his sponsorship cost him minimally. Perhaps Burton, like Marilyn Quayle, was caught up in a sort of Washington insider-evangelical-political conservative mindset.

Burton is not alone. This pattern has continued, whether out of ignorance or pragmatism. To wit :

Most citizens are not aware that Ron Godwin, vice-president of Falwell’s Moral Majority, Inc., exited that organization during the mid-to-late-1980s to work for a subsidiary of Moon’s media conglomerate (Weaver, 1986 : 16).

More recently Falwell has also by his actions accepted that Moon is now a major player in the New Christian Right, acceptable even to fundamentalist Baptists whose theologies would otherwise reject the Korean as a false messiah. In 1994 Falwell appeared to endorse the inauguration of the Unificationist Youth Federation for World Peace, sharing a commemorative photograph (along with Mr. and Mrs. Moon seated and Falwell standing beside Pak) with, among other dignitaries, Maureen Reagan, Sir Edward Heath, former U.S. Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, and Alexander M. Haig, Jr (Moffit, 1994).

_ _


Sur Alexander Haig, bien connu en Belgique :

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alexander_Haig

(...) De 1974 à 1979, Haig est nommé SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander in Europe), le commandant suprême des forces alliées en Europe, à la tête du commandement intégré européen de l'OTAN. En 1979, il est victime d'un attentat à la bombe organisé par la Fraction armée rouge (Rote Armee Fraction ou RAF, une organisation terroriste d'extrême gauche allemande) dont il sort indemne.

Il démissionne de l'armée en 1979 et devient directeur d'United Technologies pendant un an.

Début 1981, à l'arrivée de Ronald Reagan à la Maison Blanche, il devient son Secrétaire d'État (équivalent de ministre des Affaires étrangères) mais il démissionne le 24 juin 1982, en partie à cause de son autoritarisme, de son manque de diplomatie et en désaccord avec les conseillers du président. Durant l'hospitalisation de Reagan suite à l'attentat perpétré contre lui, le 30 mars 1981, il semble outrepasser ses pouvoirs en déclarant qu'il a « la situation en main. » La presse l'accuse de vouloir court-circuiter le vice-président Bush. Haig se défend en disant qu'il n'offrait pas une réponse juridique mais pratique : selon ses dires, il ne parlait pas de la succession du président, mais seulement de la situation dans laquelle se trouvait le gouvernement après l'hospitalisation de Reagan.

Considéré comme un "faucon" il entre en conflit avec le secrétaire à la Défense Caspar Weinberger. Il est notamment à l'origine de la lutte des Contras au Nicaragua et au Salvador. Il attise la tension avec les Soviétiques, provoquant l'incompréhension et le désarroi des Alliés occidentaux des États-Unis.

(...)

Pour information (cela concerne surtout l'Iran) :

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d122

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 122

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122. Conversation Among President Nixon, Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, and General Alexander Haig, Washington, April 8, 1971, 3:56-4:21 p.m.11. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 475-23. Secret. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume
Washington, April 8, 1971, 3:56-4:21 p.m

Pour information ( Douglas MacArthur II - General Lyman Limitzer ) :

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v18/d24

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960

Volume XVIII, Japan; Korea, Document 24

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24. Memorandum of ConversationSourceSource: Department of State, Central Files, 794.5/9–958. Secret. Drafted by Martin on October 13.
Washington, September 9, 1958, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
State–Defense Discussion Concerning Revision of Japanese Security Arrangements in Preparation for Meeting Between the Secretary and Foreign Minister Fujiyama

PARTICIPANTS

Department of Defense:

Mr. Mansfield Sprague
Mr. JohnIrwin
Admiral Arleigh Burke
General Lyman LemnitzerMr. William Lang
Captain Thomas Howe
Captain Elwood Baldridge

State:
FE–Mr. Robertson
FE–Mr. J. Graham Parsons
Ambassador MacArthurL–Mr. Loftus Beckre
S/P–Mr. George Morgan
H–Mr. John White
FE–Mr. Marshall Green
NA–Mr. Howard L. Parsons
NA–Mr. James V. Martin
FE–Mr. J. Owen Zurhellen
S/S–Mr. Thomas Cassilly

(...)

Ambassador MacArthur in turn agreed by pointing out that we could not use British territory either, without their consent. To this General Lemnitzer responded by saying that if we were to ask Japan we would be refused, while we would not be refused if we were to ask England. [9 lines of source text not declassified]

Ambassador MacArthur commented that the Japanese Foreign Office had a draft treaty calling for consultation and agreement on the introduction of nuclears.

(...)

Note :

Origins of the second Arab-Israel war: Egypt, Israel, and the great powers ...

Par Michael B. Oren

(…) In a further effort to address these considerations, Dulles devised Operation Stockpile. This called for the stationing of Sabre jets on Cyprus for use by Israel in the event of an Arab attack. To mitigate Arab reaction to the plan, Stockpile walso provided for the supply of defensive arms, to be stored aboard a US frigate in the Mediterranean, to the Arabs. (…)

Pour information :

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v15/d358

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1-July 26, 1956, Document 358

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358. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the British Ambassador (Makins) and the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur), Department of State, Washington, May 23, 195611. Source: Department of State, S/S–NEA Files: Lot 61 D 417, Omega #5. Top Secret; Omega. Drafted by Wilkins.
Washington, May 23, 1956

SUBJECT
Operation Stockpile
PARTICIPANTS
Sir Roger Makins, British Ambassador
Mr. Douglas MacArthur, C
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, NE

(...) Mr. MacArthur said that when the Secretary was in Paris for the NATO meeting during the first week of May he had had a talk with Selwyn Lloyd regarding Operation Stockpile. 22. See Documents 330 and 334. Mr. MacArthur stressed that this operation was in secret and was being very closely held within the United States Government. (...)

Pour information :

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d151

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 151

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151. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State11. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–661. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, Elisabethville, London, Paris, The Hague, and Salisbury.

Brussels, December 6, 1961, 9 p.m.

1005. Congo. Department telegram 1322;22. Document 145. Embassy telegrams 988 and 995.33. Telegram 988, December 5, reported that Spaak had told MacArthur that evening that the Belgians and British had almost agreed on a memorandum that they hoped would serve as a basis for agreement between Adoula and Tshombe. Telegram 995, also December 5, reported that MacArthur had taken up the proposals in the first two paragraphs of telegram 988 (Document 145) with van den Bosch that morning and had asked him to bring them to Spaak's attention. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–561) I discussed proposals to bring economic pressure on Tshombe (Department telegram 1322) with Spaak last evening.

1. He confirmed Van den Bosch statement (Embassy telegram 995) that when negotiations with Congo re financial problems are successfully completed following restoration of diplomatic relations, GOB will transfer to Congolese Government portfolio which includes shares in Katanga companies now held in trust by GOB.

2. He said while GOB does not apparently have legal authority to prevent private Belgian companies such as Union Miniere from agreeing to transfer of legal seat of corporations to Katanga he would do everything in his power to persuade them not to go along with Katangese Government on this as he agrees with us and is totally opposed to it.

3. I also suggested A) possibility of requiring Belgian companies operating in Katanga to pay dividends on Congo portfolio shares directly to GOC and B) withdrawal technical assistance personnel from Katanga and repatriation dependents of Belgian residents. Spaak was non-committal, saying these matters under study but they raised problems.

4. In conclusion, I mentioned desirability of European airlines servicing Elisabethville suspending such traffic. He said this new idea which he had not considered and he would want it studied before making any comment.

MacArthur

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–661. Confidential. Repeated to USUN, Léopoldville, Elisabethville, London, Paris, The Hague, and Salisbury.

2 Document 145.

3 Telegram 988, December 5, reported that Spaak had told MacArthur that evening that the Belgians and British had almost agreed on a memorandum that they hoped would serve as a basis for agreement between Adoula and Tshombe. Telegram 995, also December 5, reported that MacArthur had taken up the proposals in the first two paragraphs of telegram 988 (Document 145) with van den Bosch that morning and had asked him to bring them to Spaak's attention. (Both in Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/12–561)

Pour information ( Douglas MacArthur - CIA—Messrs. Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner )

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v21/d72

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XXI, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Document 72

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72. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, October 6, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles
Mr. Gordon Gray, Asst. Secretary of Defense
Admiral Radford and Mr. Charles Sullivan, Department of Defense
CIA—Messrs. Allen Dulles, Frank Wisner
USIA—Messrs. Streibert and Berding
C—Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II
FE—Assistant Secretary Mr. Robertson
PSA—James D. Bell

The Secretary stated that the meeting had been called to discuss the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty which he described as having tremendous potentialities for good or evil

Pour information

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d69

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 69

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69. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State11.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 855.0070G/6–561. Confidential. Received at 5:41 p.m. and repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, USUN, and Paris.
Brussels, June 5, 1961, 9 p.m.

2028. Paris for USRO. Congo. Embtel 1994,22. Telegram 1994 from Brussels, May 29, reported that Spaak had told MacArthur that Katangan authorities were raising problems at the prospect of withdrawal of Belgian military personnel, and the Belgian civilian population in Katanga was excited and concerned. Some Belgians were threatening a massive withdrawal of Belgian civilians, including technicians, if Belgian military personnel were withdrawn without dependable assurances that law and order would be maintained. (Ibid., 855.0070G/5– 2961) Deptel 1961 [2379].33. Telegram 2379 to Brussels, June 2, stated that the Department understood the United Nations was developing plans for replacing Belgian military personnel and was negotiating arrangements with Munongo. It suggested that MacArthur mention this to Spaak, indicate that U.S. representatives had raised this point with Hammarskjöld and his staff more than once, and express gratification that Spaak was proceeding with the withdrawal of political advisers and mercenaries. (Ibid.) I discussed Congo further with Spaak this afternoon, particularly importance of early withdrawal of Belgian advisors and military in compliance with UN resolution. Spaak said private Belgian individuals and interests in Katanga which opposed his policy of withdrawal were bombarding him and members of the government and Parliament with telegrams and letters opposing withdrawal of Belgian military personnel, saying if such withdrawal occurred situation would disintegrate into chaos and become like that in Kivu. At same time, authorities in both Elisabethville and Léopoldville have been raising increasing difficulties and objection to withdrawal of many of advisors who were on original lists Spaak submitted. In addition to Katangans (reference telegrams), Kasavubu was now also saying that he wished to retain most of the twelve persons on the withdrawal list submitted by Spaak. (Dorsinville confirmed this to us this morning.) Spaak felt that Belgians who were on withdrawal list were to considerable extent responsible for these new difficulties.

Spaak went on to say despite foregoing he determined to withdraw advisors, mercenaries and military soonest and several advisors on way home. However real key to withdrawal of Belgian military and some of pol advisors lay with UN, which must provide replacements acceptable to GOC and Katangan authorities. He asked most earnestly that we press SYG to move more rapidly in providing acceptable replacements. I mentioned that Dumontet was now negotiating this matter with Munongo (Deptel 2379). Spaak replied that while he hoped this true, he understood Dumontet had now left Congo and GOB had no indication that UN was actively negotiating this matter with Munongo.


MacArthur


1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 855.0070G/6–561. Confidential. Received at 5:41 p.m. and repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, USUN, and Paris.

2 Telegram 1994 from Brussels, May 29, reported that Spaak had told MacArthur that Katangan authorities were raising problems at the prospect of withdrawal of Belgian military personnel, and the Belgian civilian population in Katanga was excited and concerned. Some Belgians were threatening a massive withdrawal of Belgian civilians, including technicians, if Belgian military personnel were withdrawn without dependable assurances that law and order would be maintained. (Ibid., 855.0070G/5– 2961)

3 Telegram 2379 to Brussels, June 2, stated that the Department understood the United Nations was developing plans for replacing Belgian military personnel and was negotiating arrangements with Munongo. It suggested that MacArthur mention this to Spaak, indicate that U.S. representatives had raised this point with Hammarskjöld and his staff more than once, and express gratification that Spaak was proceeding with the withdrawal of political advisers and mercenaries. (Ibid.)

Pour information

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d123

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 123

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123. Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 8, 197111. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL IRAN. Secret. Drafted by Robert L. Dowell, Jr. (NEA/IRN).

Washington, April 8, 1971

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

DATE: April 8, 1971

SUBJECT: Political-Military Affairs/Iran

PARTICIPANTS: Ambassador Douglas MacArthur II, U.S. Ambassador to Iran

Mr. James H. Noyes, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Near East, South Asian and African Affairs, Department of Defense

Mr. Thomas R. Pickering, Deputy Director, PM

Mr. John Reed, Deputy Director, NESA Region, Department of Defense

Mr. Christian A. Chapman, Director, PM/MAS

Mr. Robert L. Dowell, Jr., NEA/IRN

Mr. Felix Dorough, PM/MAS

The Ambassador reviewed Iran's position and importance to the United States. In his view Iran is the only strong, stable asset we possess between Europe and Japan. Together with Turkey, it has the only dependable air corridor for civilian and military traffic from east to west and vice-versa. For other reasons our continued presence in that country is of vital interest to the security of the United States. The Ambassador recalled that the pre-World War II Molotov-Ribentrop Agreements made clear the strategic importance of the Gulf to the Soviet Union when it was stated "the region in the direction of the Persian Gulf is the center of aspirations of the Soviet Union.” Rather than achieving this goal through occupation as during and immediately after World War II the Soviets are attempting to achieve their goals through Syria, Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. The Soviets need for oil in quantity after 1980 and the feudal aspect of governments of the area make many of Iran's neighbors likely candidates for Soviet activities especially when the British pull out at the end of this year. At this reading, Iran appears as the only present possibility for stability, strength and leadership after the British withdraw.

(...)

Pour information

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v23p1/d116

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XXIII, Part 1, Japan, Document 116

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116. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 4, 1957 11. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/2–457. Secret. Drafted on February 5 by Parsons. The source text bears the typed notation: “Informal—Not cleared by the Secretary”.
Washington, February 4, 1957

SUBJECT

Various Matters Relating to Japan

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Douglas MacArthur, II, Counselor
Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary
Mr. William J. Sebald, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. Howard P. Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Mr. William V. Turnage, Deputy Director, OFD
Mr. Howard L. Parsons, Director, NA

(...)

2. Japanese War Criminals.

Mr. MacArthur added that he had discussed the principle of release of Japanese war criminals with the President, indicating that the Secretary of State is working on a formula which should succeed in early release of the eighty remaining Japanese war criminals in a manner consistent not only with United States political objectives in Japan but also with the treaty and legal procedures which have been observed in the past. He commented that he had not discussed any of the details of the specific proposal. He indicated, however, that the President was sympathetic with the view that this problem in United States-Japanese relations should be eliminated.44. By February 11, the Department had reached internal agreement on a proposal whereby war criminals would be released upon the recommendation of “a responsible and non-political board, established by the Japanese Government, after review of all pertinent facts in the case, including the trial record.” The proposal called also for the abolition of the Clemency and Parole Board. (Undated draft memorandum to the President attached to a memorandum by Pfeiffer of a conversation held February 11 between Robertson and Lieutenant General Alonzo P. Fox; Department of State, Central Files, 694.0026/2–1157) Interagency resolution of the proposal did not come for several months; see Document 176.

(...)

5. Nuclear Weapons in Japan.

Mr. MacArthur expressed a fear that political developments in Japan, particularly the struggle between the Socialist and the Liberal-Democratic party members, could lead to an insistence by the Japanese that the United States make clear its position on the extent to which the Japanese Government will be consulted prior to the introduction of more advanced nuclear weapons into Japan.

The Secretary expressed a desire if possible to continue on our present basis with the Japanese, [remainder of paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]


1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.9411/2–457. Secret. Drafted on February 5 by Parsons. The source text bears the typed notation: “Informal—Not cleared by the Secretary”.

2 No memorandum of this discussion has been found in Department of State files.

3 Tanzan Ishibashi resigned on grounds of health on February 23 and Nobusuke Kishi succeeded him on February 25. MacArthur therefore tendered the invitation to Kishi instead. See Document 122.

4 By February 11, the Department had reached internal agreement on a proposal whereby war criminals would be released upon the recommendation of “a responsible and non-political board, established by the Japanese Government, after review of all pertinent facts in the case, including the trial record.” The proposal called also for the abolition of the Clemency and Parole Board. (Undated draft memorandum to the President attached to a memorandum by Pfeiffer of a conversation held February 11 between Robertson and Lieutenant General Alonzo P. Fox; Department of State, Central Files, 694.0026/2–1157) Interagency resolution of the proposal did not come for several months; see Document 176.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d186

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 186

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186. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (McGhee) to Secretary of State Rusk 1

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870G.00/1– 562. Confidential. Drafted by Miller. Also sent to Under Secretary Ball, who initialed and forwarded it to Rusk.


Washington, January 5, 1962.

SUBJECT

Report on Our Recent Efforts With Union Miniere


As you will recall, we have initiated a series of steps involving economic measures designed to put pressure on Tshombe to convince him that he has no other alternative but to carry out the terms of the Kitona Agreement. These steps are as follows:


(1) We have talked to Andre Meyer, who has been in touch with the British interests in the Congo. A report of his efforts is contained in a recent letter to him from Bill Astor, a copy of which is at Tab A.22. Not printed. The letter from Viscount Astor to New York banker Andre Meyer, dated December 28, set forth his views on the situation in Katanga.


(2) Ambassador MacArthur has approached Spaak to urge him to cooperate with us in developing a series of economic measures designed to deny to Tshombe access to tax revenues and duties now being paid to his regime by the Union Miniere and other big companies in Katanga. Spaak has expressed agreement with the desirability of developing such a program, and, while he has raised questions about the practicability of certain aspects, Ambassador MacArthur is continuing discussions with him and his staff. We are making similar approaches to the British and Congolese Governments and the UN to gain their cooperation. A copy of the telegram containing our suggested plan is at Tab B.33. Telegram 1098, Document 179. Tab B was a paper headed "Program of Economic Pressures," identical in substance to the program set forth in that telegram.


(3) Ambassador MacArthur has approached Spaak to underscore the importance we attach to the Union Miniere's cooperation with Adoula's government and to its no longer giving moral or financial support to Tshombe's secession. A copy of Ambassador MacArthur's report of his talk with Spaak is at Tab C.44. Tab C, not attached to the source text, was a copy of telegram 1206 from Brussels, January 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 870G.00/1–462)


(4) I have made a parallel approach to the Belgian Ambassador here about the necessity for Union Miniere's cooperation. A copy of the report of my conversation is at Tab D.55. Tab D, not attached to the source text, was a copy of telegram 1662, Document 184.


(5) At our suggestion, Admiral Kirk has talked with Union Miniere and Societe Generale leaders at Brussels to gain their active support.



This morning the Belgian Ambassador came to see me to convey a report from his Government on the steps that the Union Miniere is prepared to take as a result of our various efforts with them. I am very much encouraged by the Ambassador's report, the substance of which is as follows:


(1) The Union Miniere has sent one of its Assistant Directors General to Elizabethville to see Tshombe and to stress to him the necessity of his carrying out the Kitona Agreement. He will indicate to Tshombe that if he respects the Kitona Agreement he has a fair chance to remain Katanga's leader, and further hostilities could probably be avoided. The Societe Generale representative will also talk to all of the Union Miniere leaders in Katanga to impress on them the firm views of Union Miniere leadership in Brussels regarding the necessity for Tshombe to live up to the Kitona Agreement.


(2) The Union Miniere is sending the President of the Belgian Federation of Enterprises in the Congo to Léopoldville on the 8th to make the following official demarche to the Congolese Government on Union Miniere's behalf:

A. The Union Miniere assures the Congolese Government of its willingness to cooperate with the latter as soon as arrangements between the Congolese Government and the Katangan authorities have been entered into.

B. The question of Union Miniere's obligation to the Central Government with respect to taxes and duties will be discussed.

C. The Union Miniere is ready to send all its output of copper via Matadi, the Congolese port at the mouth of the Congo River.

D. Assurances will be given regarding the Union Miniere's wish to see an agreement be reached between the Congolese Government and the Katangan authorities, which will allow everyone to work in conditions of peace and order.

E. As soon as the political situation is clarified, the Union Miniere leaders will send a representative to establish direct contact with the Congolese Government.


I had suggested to the Belgian Ambassador that it would be desirable for the Union Miniere to issue a public statement regarding its support for the Kitona Agreement. The Belgian Ambassador reported that the Union Miniere felt it would not be possible to take such a step since they were reluctant to engage in what they considered to be a political act. In view of the encouraging report otherwise that the Belgian Ambassador gave me as summarized above, I did not press this point. I did emphasize to the Ambassador the importance of direct contact between the Union Miniere and the Congolese Government and the hope that this direct contact would be established quickly. I said that this would be an important indication that the Union Miniere was dealing with the established Congolese Government and was dealing with Tshombe only in the capacity as the head of a provincial government.


1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 870G.00/1– 562. Confidential. Drafted by Miller. Also sent to Under Secretary Ball, who initialed and forwarded it to Rusk.


2 Not printed. The letter from Viscount Astor to New York banker Andre Meyer, dated December 28, set forth his views on the situation in Katanga.


3 Telegram 1098, Document 179. Tab B was a paper headed "Program of Economic Pressures," identical in substance to the program set forth in that telegram.


4 Tab C, not attached to the source text, was a copy of telegram 1206 from Brussels, January 4. (Department of State, Central Files, 870G.00/1–462)


5 Tab D, not attached to the source text, was a copy of telegram 1662, Document 184.

(...) nuclear as well as non-nuclear weapons would be used in defense of the area in the event of conflict.


_ _ _


http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v21/d84

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume XXI, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Document 84

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84. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Counselor of the Department of State (MacArthur) and the British Ambassador (Makins), Department of State, Washington, February 29, 195611. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 656. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.

Washington, February 29, 1956

SUBJECT

SEATO Military Planning

Sir Roger Makins called on me at his request today and handed me the attached memorandum22. In this memorandum, not printed, the British Government gave its preliminary views on the question of whether the SEATO Military Advisers should proceed on the assumption that nuclear as well as non-nuclear weapons would be used in defense of the area in the event of conflict. regarding SEATO Military Planning proceeding on the assumption that nuclear as well as non-nuclear weapons will be used in defense of the area.

He had been asked by Foreign Secretary Lloyd, he said, to give this to the Secretary, but in view of the great demands on the Secretary’s time he was handing the memo to me for transmittal to the Secretary.

I read the memorandum hastily and said I would of course personally see that it was brought to the Secretary’s attention. I said that commenting personally, I thought there was general agreement on the part of all members of SEATO that SEATO defense planning did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of the member governments for putting military plans into action in the event of hostilities. I said also that we fully recognized the importance of handling any publicity with respect to military planning in such a manner as not to create psychological problems. Obviously, however, if military planning was to be of any use whatsoever, the military planners on a contingency basis had to take into account all the types of forces and all the types of weapons at their disposal. Any planning which did not take into account nuclear weapons would obviously be unrealistic and not worthwhile.

I concluded by saying that in my own mind I was not certain whether the Foreign Ministers themselves would have to have a detailed discussion of this subject, and that one possibility was that the Foreign Ministers could simply approve the Military Advisers proceeding with their planning along the lines which the Military Advisers had discussed. Sir Roger said he did not know what the procedure would be at Karachi, and I replied that I felt sure it could be handled in a satisfactory manner so as not to create new problems.


1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 656. Secret. Drafted by MacArthur.

2 In this memorandum, not printed, the British Government gave its preliminary views on the question of whether the SEATO Military Advisers should proceed on the assumption that nuclear as well as non-nuclear weapons would be used in defense of the area in the event of conflict.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d82

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 82

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82. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State11.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1861. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, Elisabethville, London, and Paris.

Brussels, July 18, 1961, 4 p.m.

99. Paris pass USRO. Congo. Embtel 80.22. Telegram 80, July 14, reported a conversation the previous evening in which Spaak told MacArthur about his recent talks with Hammarskjöld at Geneva.

Hammarskjöld had argued that it was necessary to give priority to uniting Léopoldville and Stanleyville before the United Nations met in September, or U.N. members would be split between those recognizing Gizenga at Stanleyville and those recognizing Kasavubu at Léopoldville. Spaak argued that a meeting of Parliament without Tshombe ran the risk of a Communist-dominated government. He thought Tshombe was the key to the problem, and he planned to send Tshombe a letter arguing the case for a unified Congo. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–1461) I discussed the Congo situation again with Spaak last evening prior his departure for Bonn this morning. He said he sent message to Tshombe (reference telegram) indicating why interests of Katanga could best be served by cooperating with Moderates in Léopoldville and why GOB opposed separatism. He also saw British Charge yesterday and urged British influence be exerted in same sense. While he thought it very useful for UN, British, French, ourselves and other like-minded people to urge Tshombe to send representatives to Parliament and cooperate with Congolese Moderates, Spaak said we must be extremely careful not to present him with ultimatum or appear to threaten him as he might react adversely. Spaak said he believes Tshombe having great difficulty with Munongo and other "reactionaries", and that while we should continue to urge Tshombe in right direction we should use skill and finesse. Spaak also continues feel (as does Godley in Léopoldville 104 to Department)33. In telegram 104 from Léopoldville, July 14, Godley stated that he had not pressed for a specific early date for convening Parliament since it might be interpreted as meddling in purely internal affairs. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–1461) that we should not at this juncture press for specific early date for convening Parliament.

Spaak saw Robiliart (Elisabethville 57 to Department)44. Telegram 57 from Elisabethville, July 13, reported a conversation with Robiliart of Union Miniere, who was visiting Katanga briefly. Canup asked Robiliart what he had done to convince Katangans their salvation lay in reintegration with the remainder of the Congo. He replied that he had seen Tshombe but had not raised the subject, but he had discussed it with several ministers. He indicated that the Katangans were "obsessed with fear that Katanga would become mired in Congolese political and economic chaos" and he did not expect any reconciliation. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–1361) who has just returned from Katanga. While Robiliart assured Spaak Union Miniere was using its influence with Tshombe for moderation, Spaak said he told Robiliart this was contrary to information GOB had received, which was that Union Miniere was not effectively using its influence with Tshombe to get him to cooperate with Moderates and send representatives to Parliament. I told Spaak I was glad that he taking this stand with Robiliart and in strictest confidence told him I understood Alan Kirk55. Retired Admiral Alan G. Kirk had served as Ambassador to Belgium, 1946–1949. also urging Union Miniere and Societe Generale to be constructive.

Spaak concluded by saying political atmosphere in Congo very murky but he hoping for best and will continue do all he can to get Tshombe cooperation with Moderates.

MacArthur

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/7–1861. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, USUN, Elisabethville, London, and Paris.

2 Telegram 80, July 14, reported a conversation the previous evening in which Spaak told MacArthur about his recent talks with Hammarskjöld at Geneva. Hammarskjöld had argued that it was necessary to give priority to uniting Léopoldville and Stanleyville before the United Nations met in September, or U.N. members would be split between those recognizing Gizenga at Stanleyville and those recognizing Kasavubu at Léopoldville. Spaak argued that a meeting of Parliament without Tshombe ran the risk of a Communist-dominated government. He thought Tshombe was the key to the problem, and he planned to send Tshombe a letter arguing the case for a unified Congo. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–1461)

3 In telegram 104 from Léopoldville, July 14, Godley stated that he had not pressed for a specific early date for convening Parliament since it might be interpreted as meddling in purely internal affairs. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–1461)

4 Telegram 57 from Elisabethville, July 13, reported a conversation with Robiliart of Union Miniere, who was visiting Katanga briefly. Canup asked Robiliart what he had done to convince Katangans their salvation lay in reintegration with the remainder of the Congo. He replied that he had seen Tshombe but had not raised the subject, but he had discussed it with several ministers. He indicated that the Katangans were "obsessed with fear that Katanga would become mired in Congolese political and economic chaos" and he did not expect any reconciliation. (Ibid., 770G.00/7–1361)

5 Retired Admiral Alan G. Kirk had served as Ambassador to Belgium, 1946–1949.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d106

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 106

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106. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State11. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1261. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, and USUN.

Brussels, September 12, 1961, 3 p.m.

420. Congo. Embtel 409.22. Telegram 409 from Brussels, September 11, reported a conversation on September 9 between MacArthur and Linner in which Linner described his meeting that day with Spaak. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–1161) I met with Spaak last evening to discuss Linner visit (reftel) and general Congo situation. Spaak said Linner was "charmant et gentil" and he appreciated frankness with which he had spoken. However, from what Linner had told him, he understood UN was seriously contemplating major moves, including action against Munongo, which went far beyond UN mandate. What troubled him was that UN did not seem to have any definite plan for peaceful political reintegration of Katanga by GOC at Léopoldville and was groping, improvising and playing it by ear. This could be very dangerous and result in disaster if any serious mistake was made.

Spaak said he most concerned by this situation. He also has related problem in that Belgian elements opposing his policy of full cooperation with UN are using present unstable and deteriorating situation in Katanga to attack and undermine GOB. For example, Union Miniere has just written him letter pointing out GOB policy (supporting UN) responsible for bringing about instability in Katanga and grave threat to Belgian economic and industrial activities there, et cetera. This letter clearly for record to provide basis for future attack against GOB if Katanga situation not straightened out.

Spaak said present deterioration in Katanga comes at particularly bad time for GOB, which must face serious domestic political situation (reported separately) over A) fiscal reforms; B) GOB measures re Flemish-Walloon problem, and, to lesser extent, C) legislation to deal with ailing coal industry. He explained Congo problem added to domestic political problems could jeopardize future of present government.

Reverting to Congo, Spaak said UN and GOC pressing him to withdraw Belgian Consuls from Elisabethville. While he would like to cooperate with UN and Léopoldville on this, he does not see how it possible to withdraw Consuls this juncture because if he does so Katangans may refuse to permit return of any Belgian Consul accredited only to GOC in Léopoldville and it impossible in present disorderly situation in Katanga to deprive many thousands of Belgian residents there of services and assistance of a Consul. Belgian public, Parliamentary and press opinion would strongly oppose any such gamble.

Comment: Spaak was depressed over Congo and much troubled because he knows of no UN and GOC plan for peaceful political reintegration of Katanga. He fears situation may deteriorate to point of chaos unless there constructive and well-planned program, and his concern doubtless augmented by criticism and attacks against him by certain powerful interests in Belgium.

In light Linner request in reference telegram I have no objection to Gullion informing Linner of Spaak reaction to Linner's visit and general gist of my talk with Spaak if, but only if, Linner will keep this information confidential for his own background [9 lines of source text not declassified].

MacArthur

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–1261. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to Léopoldville, Elisabethville, and USUN.

2 Telegram 409 from Brussels, September 11, reported a conversation on September 9 between MacArthur and Linner in which Linner described his meeting that day with Spaak. (Ibid., 770G.00/9–1161)

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d134

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 134

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134. Telegram From the Embassy in Belgium to the Department of State11.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, London, Paris, and USUN.

Brussels, October 31, 1961, 4 p.m.

790. Congo: Re: Department telegrams 95422. Document 132. and 102033. Telegram 1020 to Brussels, October 29, transmitted the text of a letter from Rusk to Spaak emphasizing the importance the United States attached to the need to bring about the peaceful integration of Katanga with the rest of the Congo as soon as possible, and reiterating the U.S. request for Spaak's assistance in bringing political and economic pressures to bear on Tshombe, including convincing Belgian business interests in Katanga to cooperate in this. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2961) and Embassy telegram 748.44. Telegram 748 from Brussels, October 23, reported that MacArthur had discussed telegram 954 (Document 132) with Spaak, who replied that he would give the U.S. suggestion close study but it raised serious political, legal, and practical problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2361)

Although I received Department telegram 1020 shortly before I saw Spaak last evening, there was insufficient time for me to prepare text to hand him. Accordingly I spoke to him about message from Secretary and promised to send him text (which I delivered to Rothschild this morning).

Spaak said that following our meeting October 23 he had requested Foreign Office as matter of urgency to make thorough study as to financial, economic, or other measures that might be taken to bring greater pressure on Tshombe. While this study not complete, it already clear that there are serious legal as well as political difficulties involved. However, he fully agrees that maximum pressure must be exerted on Tshombe and assured me that he wishes to take all feasible steps. In addition to possible financial and economic steps Spaak has already decided to proceed with following three measures:

1. He will deny or withdraw (if physically possible) passports of all Belgian mercenaries and make public announcement of this today or tomorrow.

2. He is replacing Belgian military in Belgian Consul General in Elisabethville with civilian functionaries (Department telegram 1008 and Embassy telegram 786).55. Dated October 27 and 30. (Ibid., 325.70G/10–2761 and 770G.5455/10–3061)

3. He has ordered Longerstaey (Belgian representative Léopoldville) and Colonel Vandewalle (in charge Belgian Consul General Elisabethville) to return to Brussels to discuss possible measures which may be taken to bring Tshombe and Adoula together.

Spaak warned however that his relations with Tshombe were very close to breaking point and that Tshombe had recently threatened to nationalize certain Belgian industrial interests in Katanga "if hostile attitude of Spaak and GOB continues". Despite risks involved in GOB relations with Tshombe, Spaak felt above three steps would be helpful and therefore he is taking them. However, tenseness of relations with Tshombe and latter's ability to do lasting damage to legitimate Belgian interests in Katanga emphasizes difficulties and risks involving precipitous financial and economic sanctions against Tshombe.

MacArthur

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–161. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Léopoldville, London, Paris, and USUN.

2 Document 132.

3 Telegram 1020 to Brussels, October 29, transmitted the text of a letter from Rusk to Spaak emphasizing the importance the United States attached to the need to bring about the peaceful integration of Katanga with the rest of the Congo as soon as possible, and reiterating the U.S. request for Spaak's assistance in bringing political and economic pressures to bear on Tshombe, including convincing Belgian business interests in Katanga to cooperate in this. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2961)

4 Telegram 748 from Brussels, October 23, reported that MacArthur had discussed telegram 954 (Document 132) with Spaak, who replied that he would give the U.S. suggestion close study but it raised serious political, legal, and practical problems. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/10–2361)

5 Dated October 27 and 30. (Ibid., 325.70G/10–2761 and 770G.5455/10–3061)

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-57v05/d132

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957

Volume V, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Document 132

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132. Letter From Foreign Minister Pinay to Secretary of State Dulles11.
Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 489. The source text is a translation of Note No. 327 prepared in the French Embassy at Washington and delivered to MacArthur, together with the French text, on June 4.

Paris, June 4, 1955.

DEAR MR. FOSTER DULLES: The President of the Council and I have examined the question of possible dates for a Four-Power Conference, in light of the considerations that have been set forth to us in London as well as Washington. Our wish is, certainly, to see the conversation commenced as soon as possible under the best conditions for preparation and for success.

We recognize that numerous reasons of all kinds exist for a meeting in July on the dates proposed in your last message. Even though these dates raise serious difficulties for the carrying out of French parliamentary work, we are disposed to accept them. It might be necessary, in order to do so, to suspend the parliamentary debates. As this exceptional procedure could not be prolonged or renewed, it seems necessary to us, as Mr. Macmillan suggests, to agree immediately among ourselves that the discussions of the Chiefs of Government could extend, if necessary, throughout a full week.

With regard to the meeting of the three Ministers of Foreign Affairs at New York before San Francisco, regardless of the difficulty that causes me, I have made arrangements to be in New York on June 16 to meet with you and Mr. Macmillan before we meet at San Francisco with Mr. Molotov. Please accept [etc.]22. On June 6, Secretary Dulles replied to this message welcoming French agreement to the proposed arrangements. Dulles also stated that he would certainly not exclude extending the Four-Power Conference to 5 days, but such a decision would have to be taken in light of developments at the conference. (Ibid., CF 483)


Antoine Pinay


Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.


1 Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 63 D 123, CF 489. The source text is a translation of Note No. 327 prepared in the French Embassy at Washington and delivered to MacArthur, together with the French text, on June 4.

2 On June 6, Secretary Dulles replied to this message welcoming French agreement to the proposed arrangements. Dulles also stated that he would certainly not exclude extending the Four-Power Conference to 5 days, but such a decision would have to be taken in light of developments at the conference. (Ibid., CF 483)

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d77


5 Telegram 2123 from Brussels, June 20, reported a conversation between MacArthur and Spaak in which MacArthur urged speedy withdrawal from Katanga of a number of Belgian "advisers" and at least some Belgian "mercenaries." (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/6–2061) Telegram 2080 from Brussels, June 12, reported that MacArthur had been urging the Societe Generale, Union Miniere, and other private companies with interests in the Congo to use their influence with the Katanga authorities to encourage rapprochement with Léopoldville. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–1261) Telegram 2152 from Brussels, June 23, reported a conversation along these lines between MacArthur and Herman Robiliart, President of Union Miniere and a director of the Societe Generale. (Ibid., 770G.00/6–2361)

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d300


2 In telegram 518, September 27, MacArthur referred to Spaak's September 24 statement to Rusk and McGhee that if negotiations failed, he would have his government persuade Union Miniere to close down its plants in Katanga (see Document 294). MacArthur expressed doubt that Spaak could make this position prevail with the Cabinet, Parliament, and public. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/9–2762)

En lien avec la tentative d'enlèvement de MacArthur II lorsqu'il était ambassadeur en Iran :

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d104

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume E–4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Document 104

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104. Telegram 5332 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, December 10, 1970, 1240Z11.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 5272 from Tehran, December 7, Hoveyda had speculated that the radical Iranian student groups abroad, and perhaps also the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), could have been involved in the attack. Since the attack had betrayed the weaknesses in the Iranian system, the Prime Minister also had requested U.S. assistance in putting Iranian security files into processed data form. (Ibid., POL IRAN-US)

December 10, 1970, 1240Z

Department of State

TEHRAN 5332

R 101240Z DEC 70

FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2949

TEHRAN 5332

SUBJECT: SHAH'S VIEWS ON ABDUCTION ATTEMPT

REF: TEHRAN 5132 AND 5272

1. WHEN I SAW SHAH DEC 9 HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE AND RELIEF THAT NO HARM HAD BEFALLEN US AS RESULT NOV 30 ABDUCTION ATTEMPT. HE WAS ALSO HAPPY TO HEAR FROM HIS SECURITY PEOPLE THAT NEITHER OF US HAD BEEN UNNERVED BY EXPERIENCE. HE SAID HE HAD INSTRUCTED IRANIAN SECURITY AUTHORITIES TO FIND PERPETRATORS. HE WAS PERSONALLY CONVINCED THAT "THE SAME COMMUNIST ELEMENTS" THAT WERE WORKING ON IRANIAN STUDENTS ABROAD, PARTICULARLY IN WEST GERMANY, AUSTRIA, ITALY AND FOR THAT MATTER THE US, AS ATTACK ON IRANIAN CONSULATE IN SAN FRANCISCO DEMONSTRATED, WERE BEHIND ATTEMPT. HE REASONED THAT BY ABDUCTING AMERICAN AMBASSADOR AND THEN INSISTING IRAN GOVT RELEASE "POLITICAL PRISONERS" COMMUNIST PERPETRATORS WOULD GAIN WORLDWIDE ATTENTION AND COULD THEN TRY TO DISCREDIT SHAH'S WHITE REVOLUTION AND PROGRAM OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS BY PORTRAYING GOI AS FASCIST DICTATORSHIP WHICH WAS HOLDING LARGE NUMBERS OF "POLITICAL PRISONERS.”

GP-3.

MACARTHUR

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 US-IRAN. Secret; Nodis. In Telegram 5272 from Tehran, December 7, Hoveyda had speculated that the radical Iranian student groups abroad, and perhaps also the Palestinian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), could have been involved in the attack. Since the attack had betrayed the weaknesses in the Iranian system, the Prime Minister also had requested U.S. assistance in putting Iranian security files into processed data form. (Ibid., POL IRAN-US)

MacArthur et les forces américaines en Europe ...


http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v13/d199

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968

Volume XIII, Western Europe Region, Document 199

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199. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (MacArthur) to Secretary of State Rusk11.
Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur. The source text bears the notation “for Pres Evening Reading.” Copies were also sent to Ball, Leddy, and Johnson.

Washington, September 1, 1966.

SUBJECT

Informal Conversations with Senators Kuchel and Dirksen regarding Senator Mansfield's Resolution Calling for a Reduction of US Forces in Europe22. F
or text of the Mansfield resolution (S. Res. 300), August 31, see The Congressional Record, 1966, Senate, p. 21442. —Information Memorandum
Senator Kuchel:

I had a good personal talk with Senator Kuchel this morning regarding the Mansfield resolution, explaining that we had not been consulted on its contents, timing, or indeed its introduction on the floor of the Senate. I said the resolution was a very bad one and would create major problems for us in NATO which was already suffering from General De Gaulle's withdrawal. Furthermore, it would cause difficult problems for Chancellor Erhard who would be visiting the US later this month. I explained that for several months at closed NATO meetings, you and other US representatives have been stressing the theme that there cannot be a double standard whereby the US is expected to meet agreed force goals but other NATO members need not meet theirs. The introduction of this resolution would most certainly be exploited by the Gaullists to prove their contention that the US was not dependable and also lead to charges of unilateral US action that further undermined NATO. Finally, the resolution would not be a helpful backdrop for the talks you would be having with Gromyko in New York later this month at the UN General Assembly.33. At his September 8 press conference, President Johnson addressed the question of troop strength in Europe, saying that he was aware of the sense of the Senate on this issue, but that it could not be solved by Senate resolutions. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 998–999)

With respect to Senator Mansfield's suggestion that the resolution be put on the consent calendar with no committee hearings, I pointed out that the April 1951 resolution, calling for the sending of troops to Europe,44. S. Res. 99, 82d Congress. had been considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee and that there were over 800 pages of published testimony of those Committee hearings. I summarized by saying that the resolution was damaging to US national interests. While under any circumstances it would be damaging because of its timing, the resolution was even more harmful because it made absolutely no reference to NATO consultations or to a reciprocal reduction of forces by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe.

Senator Kuchel said he agreed and did not like the resolution. He thought it absurd that the sponsors had not mentioned NATO consultation and also required the Soviet Union to reciprocate by reducing their forces in Eastern Europe. He said that while the Department might not have been notified by Mansfield, he had assumed from what Mansfield said while introducing the resolution that the President had been fully consulted and had not disapproved. I said that while I could not undertake to speak for the President, I personally felt certain that the President had not been consulted on the contents or the timing of the introduction of the resolution.

Senator Kuchel said that it was also absurd for the sponsors to ask that the resolution be put on the consent calendar. It was particularly nonsensical to suggest that this resolution, which was one of great import, did not need to be examined by committee when as a general practice the Senate referred the most trivial resolutions to committee and the original 1951 resolution had been thoroughly aired in committee.

The Senator said he wanted to help and asked whether on a personal and private basis there were any Administration papers or remarks that I could pass to him without attribution. I replied that my conversation with him was personal and that while there were no papers that I could give him, I did want him to know our views because of the serious damage to our national interests that passage of the resolution might entail.

Senator Kuchel said he fully understood and appreciated very much my call. He was determined to see the resolution be sent to committee and he would try to be helpful in defeating or modifying it. He suggested that we have another talk the middle of next week if there were any new developments.

Senator Dirksen:

I also talked to Senator Dirksen along the same lines as I had talked to Senator Kuchel, stressing the damage that the resolution could do in our relations with NATO and the Germans and the comfort it could give to the Soviet Union which would not fail to exploit it along with other elements unfriendly to the US such as the Gaullists. Senator Dirksen said he agreed. He had met with his Republican colleagues this morning on this subject and enjoined them “to stay off this resolution” and not to hold any press conferences on the subject. He would renew this advice.

1 Source: Department of State, S/S Files: Lot 74 D 164. Confidential; Limit Distribution. Drafted by MacArthur. The source text bears the notation “for Pres Evening Reading.” Copies were also sent to Ball, Leddy, and Johnson.

2 For text of the Mansfield resolution (S. Res. 300), August 31, see The Congressional Record, 1966, Senate, p. 21442.

3 At his September 8 press conference, President Johnson addressed the question of troop strength in Europe, saying that he was aware of the sense of the Senate on this issue, but that it could not be solved by Senate resolutions. (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1966, pp. 998–999)

4 S. Res. 99, 82d Congress.

MacArthur II - Davignon

http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v20/d343

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963

Volume XX, Congo Crisis, Document 343

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343. Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State11.
Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2962. Confidential; Priority. Received at 3:25 a.m. on November 30 and repeated to Brussels, London, Léopoldville, and Elisabethville.

New York, November 29, 1962, 9 p.m.

2034. Eyes only Secretary and McGhee. Eyes only Principal Officers. Policy.
Subject: Congo.
Reference: USUN 2015.22. Document 342.

Prior to meeting with Bunche this morning, Rothschild, Loridan and Davignon met at mission with Yost and MacArthur.

Rothschild said text of new proposal agreed on last night (USUN 2015 [2016])33. See footnote 3, Document 342. was still satisfactory to Belgians but that Spaak thought best not present it to Bunche since it might necessitate new consultations by Bunche with SYG. This was agreed. Belgians accepted without reservations redraft of text done this a.m. in USUN, which has purpose of tightening up previous text and adding reference to conveying decisions reached to Tshombe. New text, which approved by McGhee in telecon with Pedersen, follows by separate telegram.44. Telegram 2037 from USUN, November 29.
(Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2962) Understanding is that it will be used only internally by US and Belgians. In place this text group approved brief talking paper for discussion with Bunche. Text this paper also follows by separate telegram.55. Telegram 2039 from USUN, November 29. (Ibid.)

(...)

Comment: Meeting resulted in clear understanding that Gardiner would take lead in presenting new proposal to Adoula, basing himself on talking paper which, however, would not be given Adoula. Paper would be transmitted by USUN to Gullion and given by him to Belgian Ambassador. Both Ambassadors would await Gardiner's arrival and consult with him on how best support latter's approach to Adoula. UN is clearly committed to proposal and Gardiner apparently ready do his best to sell it to Adoula without suggesting any alternative measures. Consultations will begin as soon as Adoula can arrange be absent from Léopoldville. UK will not be initially invited and decision on Tshombe will await developments with Adoula having veto over invitation to Tshombe to come to New York. There appears little prospect in any event that SYG will favor this course, though it remains open as possibility.

Stevenson

1 Source: Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2962. Confidential; Priority. Received at 3:25 a.m. on November 30 and repeated to Brussels, London, Léopoldville, and Elisabethville.

2 Document 342.

3 See footnote 3, Document 342.

4 Telegram 2037 from USUN, November 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 770G.00/11–2962)

5 Telegram 2039 from USUN, November 29. (Ibid.)

6 Paragraph D listed elements to be included in the prospective consultations in New York, including: 1) arrangements concerning foreign exchange and taxes, 2) steps that might be taken to equip one or two ANC battalions, 3) additional economic measures to implement the plan, 4) formulas for application of the rest of the plan, such as military oath, amnesty, and military integration, 5) proposals that the Congolese Government declare its intention to give careful consideration to proposed amendments to the constitution, including those from Tshombe, consistent with the U.N. plan, and 6) methods of conveying the decisions of the consultations to Tshombe.