Alexander HAIG

La seconde partie du livre est sur :

http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97401954/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Part-Two

La troisième partie est sur :

http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97429397/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Part-Three

Pour la totalité du llivre :

http://www.scribd.com/BEGHINSELEN

Plus précisément :

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97266203/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Introduction

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97277313/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Part-One

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97401954/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Part-Two

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97429397/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Part-Three

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97531514/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Part-Four

http://www.scribd.com/doc/97532031/HAIG-The-General-s-Progress-Epilogue-Index

Le lien entre Alexander Haig et la junte argentine est intéressant. Etait-ce lié à la présence de la loge P2 argentine ?

L'Amiral Emilio Eduardo Massera (né à Paraná le 19 octobre 1925 et mort le 8 novembre 20101 à l'Hôpital Naval de Buenos Aires) est un militaire argentin qui fut, de 1976 à 1978, membre de la junte militaire qui avait renversé, lors d'un coup d'État, la présidente Isabel Martínez de Perón et gouverna l'Argentine durant la dictature militaire appelée Proceso de Reorganización Nacional.

Il fut également membre de la loge P2 dirigée en Italie par Licio Gelli.

↑ Buongiorno, Pino, L'Internazionale dal Venerabile Licio dans Andrea Barbieri et. al.; "L'Italia della P2" - publication Milan: Mondadori (1981)
↑ a, b et c Fabrizio Calvi et Olivier Schmidt, Intelligences secrètes. Annales de l'espionnage, Hachette, 1988, p. 71

Voir WIKIPEDIA sur Licio Gelli

Voir aussi :

http://www.pagina12.com.ar/1998/98-12/98-12-14/pag03.htm

_ _ _


http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-28/haig-wanted-to-tell-argentina-u-k-s-falklands-plans.html

Haig Wanted to Tell Argentina U.K.’s Falklands Plans

By Thomas Penny & Robert Hutton - Dec 28, 2012 1:01 AM GMT+0100

Alexander Haig, the U.S. secretary of state under Ronald Reagan, had to be persuaded not to pass on U.K. military plans to Argentina during the Falklands War, newly released British documents show.

Haig was trying to broker a peace deal over the disputed islands in the South Atlantic. He told Nicholas Henderson, the British ambassador in Washington, he would have to inform the Argentines about U.K. plans to recapture the island of South Georgia if he was to maintain his position of “even- handedness,” according to files from 1982 released by the National Archives in London today.

“He therefore thought that he would have to give the Argentinian junta advance notice of our intended operation,” Henderson wrote in a note on April 21, four days before South Georgia was retaken. “I expressed strong objection.”

The documents also make clear the extent of U.S. support for the British during the crisis even as Haig was attempting to get the two sides to sign a peace deal. Ammunition and equipment were provided on a “use or return” basis, limpet mines were sent for sinking Argentine ships and the aircraft carrier USS Dwight D. Eisenhower was earmarked by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger to provide a “mobile runway” in the South Atlantic.

Voice of America, the U.S. foreign broadcasting service, agreed to carry British versions of events in the Falklands after the Argentine military junta jammed the British Broadcasting Corp., and the U.S. sought to buy into Brazilian transmitters to strengthen VOA’s signal to Argentina.
‘Presentational Problems’

“The U.S. have met in full virtually all our requests and have been very helpful in setting up arrangements for handling them quickly,” David Omand, an official at the Ministry of Defense, wrote in a note. “The clandestine nature of the assistance does pose difficult presentational problems for both the Americans and us.”

Haig was persuaded not to warn Argentina about Britain’s plans. “I am grateful to you for having averted what could have been a very dangerous development,” Foreign Secretary Francis Pym wrote in a cable to Henderson. “I find it amazing that it should have crossed the Americans’ mind that they ought to tell the Argentinians about our impending move.”

The U.S. was concerned about its relations with other countries in Latin America, though the files, released by the National Archives after being kept confidential for the prescribed 30 years, show that confusion over the U.S. stance stretched around the world.
‘Extremely Disturbed’

A telegram from the British Embassy in Oman said the country’s sultan was “extremely disturbed” at the U.S.’s apparent lack of support for Britain.

“It made them wonder whether they could really rely on the Americans in a crisis,” according to a section highlighted in the margin by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. “He thought the American government should have supported us right from the start.”

Thatcher thanked Reagan for “his magnificent support of the U.K.’s position,” according to notes of a meeting between the two leaders on June 9. “Her grief was that she could not specify in public the extent of that support.”

Israel and France also offered backing to the U.K. on the condition that it was not made public. The Israelis sent a message through Marcus Sieff, chairman of retailer Marks & Spencer, saying Prime Minister Menachem Begin had ordered arms exports to Argentina to be held up by bureaucracy, though he was “concerned that it should not be publicly known.”
Exocet Order

Much British diplomatic and covert effort was devoted to preventing Argentina getting new supplies of French-built Exocet anti-ship missiles, which could be used against the British naval task force in the South Atlantic. President Francois Mitterrand told Thatcher at a meeting in May that he wouldn’t allow a Peruvian order of Exocets to leave his country, out of concern they would be passed to Argentina. Fearing the damage that would be done to France’s arms business if his pledge became known, he requested “total confidence.”

In his memoirs, Defense Secretary John Nott hinted, without giving details, at even greater French cooperation, writing that British agents had identified Exocets for sale and “covertly rendered them inoperable, based on information provided by the French.”

After an Exocet attack on the British destroyer HMS Sheffield on May 4, which led to its sinking six days later, a director of Israel Aircraft Industries Ltd. phoned the British Embassy in Tel Aviv.
Israeli Apology

The director apologized “that one of his products should be responsible for so much damage,” a telegram from the embassy ran. “He was certain an IAI product was responsible but would not respond to questions on mark or type.”

Thatcher told Reagan in a message on May 5 that she was ready to “go along” with Haig’s proposals for a cease-fire and an interim peace-keeping force on the islands to oversee an Argentine withdrawal if it would avoid bloodshed. She said she had “misgivings” about the vague language being used on the future of the islands, which Haig insisted was the only way of getting the Argentines to sign up.

“With so many young lives at risk -- British and Argentine -- I feel that we must make a supreme effort to prevent a major military clash,” Thatcher wrote in a message that also urged Reagan to increase economic pressure on Argentina.

Argentina refused to sign up to the peace deal, and after fierce battles that saw ships sunk on both sides and hand-to- hand fighting on the islands, Argentine forces surrendered on June 14. The death toll included 255 British soldiers, 649 Argentines and three women from the islands, killed accidentally by British fire.

Tensions over the islands have heightened again this year, with Argentina protesting the U.K.’s deployment of a modern warship to the region and British Prime MinisterDavid Cameron describing Argentina’s claim to the islands as “like colonialism.” The islanders will hold a referendum next year on their allegiance to Britain, in an effort to show Argentina they’re happy with the status quo.


To contact the reporters on this story: Thomas Penny in London at tpenny@bloomberg.net; Robert Hutton in London at rhutton1@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story: James Hertling at jhertling@bloomberg.net

_ _ _


US wanted to warn Argentina about South Georgia; The United States wanted to give Argentina advance warning that Britain was going to retake South Georgia in 1982 in a move that would have spelt disaster ahead of the Falklands campaign, according to newly released files.

By Neil Tweedie and Steven Swinford

28 décembre 2012

The Telegraph Online © 2012. Telegraph Media Group Ltd.


The proposal, by US secretary of state Alexander Haig, was intended to show the military junta in Buenos Aires that America was a neutral player and could be trusted to act impartially during negotiations to end the conflict.

However, the British ambassador in Washington was so appalled that he demanded a categorical assurance it would not happen and warned that any advance notice could lead to devastating submarine or air attacks.

The heated exchanges are detailed in previously secret files released by the National Archives, which show how strained the special relationship became during the British campaign in the Falkland Islands.

Ronald Reagan, the then US President, made repeated last-ditch attempts to persuade Margaret Thatcher to negotiate a truce so the Argentinians could save face and avoid "complete humiliation".

He feared that support for a European colonial power would undermine ties with Latin America and hamper Washington’s covert campaign against communism in the western hemisphere.

Thatcher refused, telling Mr Reagan in a late night phone call on May 31st, 1982 that she would "not contemplate" a ceasfire after the loss of "precious British lives".

She also rejected demands to hand the Falklands over to a joint US-Brazilian peacekeeping force, saying that she had not sent British forces across the globe just to "hand over the Queen's islands to a contact group".

Separately, Mrs Thatcher found herself subject to demands from the Pope John Paul II. In one telegram, he calls on God to help "secure an immediate ceasefire. Thatcher, however, stood her ground, replying that Argentine aggression "cannot be allowed to succeed".

The British government also warned the Holy Father that if he cancelled a visit during the Falklands it would be "interpreted by the British public and others as a pro-Argentine gesture"

While US defense secretary Caspar Weinberger proved a staunch ally of Britain from the outbreak of war on April 2 1982, authorising secret shipments of weapons vital to the task force, the US state department was anything but sympathetic to British interests.

During a meeting on April 21, as SAS troops were already landing on South Georgia to reconnoitre Argentinian positions, Haig explained his thinking to Sir Nicholas Henderson, Britain’s ambassador to the United States.

“Haig said that he had been giving further thought to our proposed operation, an event that he was sure would alter the whole scene," wrote Henderson in a cable to London. “His immediate concern was the problem that it would cause for the US in their dealings with Argentina.

"The latter would regard it as an act of collusion between Washington and London. The Argentinians would know that they, the Americans, must have had prior knowledge of the intended invasion. Haig told me that in fact they had collateral intelligence now of the presence of the task force off South Georgia.

"The Argentinians would be deeply suspicious if the Americans had done nothing, having received information of British military intentions. He therefore thought that he would have to give the Argentinian junta advance notice of our intended operation.

"He would say that they knew about this from their own intelligence sources. He would only notify them at a sufficiently late time so that this would involve no military threat to us.

"If the Americans acted in this way they would be able to show even-handedness to the Argentinians and this would enable them to continue their role as go-between."

In fact, any warning could have been disastrous. Neither the British nor the Americans were aware of the presence of the Argentinian submarine Santa Fe in the area, and the junta had also planned a long-range attack on an invading force using Canberra bombers.

South Georgia, a mountainous wasteland of rock and ice, was defended by 140 troops who would have benefitted from even a few hours’ notice of an attack. Henderson was flabbergasted.

“I expressed strong objection to what Haig had told me," he wrote. “It would be taken extremely adversely in London as going much further than the requirements of negotiating neutrally required. To hand on to the Argentinians US intelligence about British movements and intentions at an extremely delicate moment was to help them and was not simply to be neutral.

“The Argentinians might well turn such prior intelligence to their own use against our invasion force. They would certainly give the marines and other Argentinians present in South Georgia advance warning. They might well give their submarines instructions to attack our ships. They could mount a suicide air attack upon our naval forces."

In what must at times have been a heated exchange, Haig and his deputy, Lawrence Eagleburger, backed down, saying it “would not do" at if prior warning led to “military difficulties" for the British.

But they wanted to know how the US could preserve its status as a neutral negotiator.

“I said that I must insist beyond shadow of doubt that they would not give prior notice to the Argentinians," wrote Henderson. “Haig gave me an absolute assurance on that point."

Pym, who had replaced Lord Carrington as Foreign Secretary following the latter’s resignation over the seizure of the Falklands, was equally appalled.

“I am grateful to you for having averted what could have been a very dangerous development," he wrote to Henderson. “I find it amazing that it should have crossed the Americans’ mind that they ought to tell the Argentinians about our impending move."

In a sign that he did not trust the Americans, Pym told Henderson to be deliberately vague about the timing of the South Georgia operation, citing the uncertain weather.

On May 25, four days after the British landing at San Carlos, Haig was asserting US interests again.

“We are fast approaching the point at which the UK will have a decisive local military advantage, with success clearly within your reach," he told Pym. “At that point, the Argentines could feel compelled to turn to the Cubans and Soviets as their last hope to avert total humiliation. Should Galtieri resist these pressures, he could be swept aside and replaced by those far more hostile to fundamental western interests.

Even if the Argentines do not open themselves to the Soviets and Cubans, they are virtually certain to want to continue a state of war."

That, he warned, would result in an open-ended conflict and international isolation for the UK and US. The solution was for British forces to withdraw once Port Stanley had fallen. “

The US would be prepared to provide a battalion-sized force for the purpose of ensuring that there would no violation of any interim agreement preceding a final settlement," he continued.

“Because of what has happened to our standing with the Argentines as a result of our support for you, there is no chance a US-only force would be acceptable. We would therefore need to persuade the most trustworthy major hemispheric power – Brazil – to join us. A combined force would represent a credible deterrent and assure the security of the islanders for the period of an interim agreement."

Too much blood had been spilled for Margaret Thatcher even to consider such a proposal. The British weren’t going anywhere.

Un article de 1981 ...


PROOF OF SOVIET-AIDED TERROR IS SCARCE

By RICHARD HALLORAN, Special to the New York Times

9 February 1981
The New York Times
Late City Final Edition
Copyright 1981 The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved.


WASHINGTON, Feb. 8 -- Officials with access to United States intelligence services say they have little evidence to substantiate Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr.'s allegation that the Soviet Union trains, equips and provides funds for international terrorists.

Soviet diplomats said that their Government had filed a note of protest to Mr. Haig, denying that the Soviet Union engaged in terrorism and labeling Mr. Haig's accusations a ''gross and malicious deception.''

Secretary Haig said on Jan. 28 in his first news conference that the Soviet Union, as part of a ''conscious policy,'' undertook the ''training, funding and equipping'' of international terrorists. He asserted that Moscow fostered, supported and expanded that activity.

But officials in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the State Department, asked to document those charges, said they were unable to do so. ''There's just no real evidence for it,'' said an official. Bloc Has Had Few Attacks

Mr. Haig also asserted that Soviet support for international terrorism was ''surprising'' because ''the Soviet Union itself has been victimized by it.''

Reports made public by the C.I.A. said that about 5 percent of the victims of terrorism were nationals of the Soviet Union or its East European allies. Relatively few terrorist attacks are known to have taken place inside the Soviet bloc.

A recent study of 18 embassies under siege, written by Brian M. Jenkins of the Rand Corporation, a research institute, showed that no diplomatic posts of the Soviet Union or its allies had been attacked and that only one embassy in a Communist country had been invaded. An anti-Castro Cuban kidnapped the Belgian and French ambassadors at the French Embassy in Havana in 1973.

Specialists in terrorism outside the Government said it was important to distingush between Soviet support for what the Communists call national liberation movements, which the Soviet Union avowedly supports, and genuine terrorism. The Soviet Union has admitted aiding its allies in Vietnam and the Palestine Liberation Organization and has barely concealed its help to Communists in Turkey. Little Evidence Is Available

But those specialists said there was little evidence to show that the Soviet Union had formed, trained or directed terrorist organizations such as the Red Brigades in Italy or the Japanese Red Army. Those groups, the specialists said, would most likely have appeared whether they had Russian help or not because they were products of political forces within their own countries.

The specialists said, however, that some Russian help to terrorists might have come from Libya, which has been the recipient of large shipments of Soviet arms that later were sold or distributed to terrorists.

Some organizations that have carried out terrorist attacks, such as the P.L.O., have also sent people to the Soviet Union for training, the specialists said. A Palestinian terrorist, Adnan Jaber, who is in prison in Israel, said last year that he had been given six months training in the Soviet Union in weapons, tactics and explosives.

He also said that similar training was conducted in Vietnam and North Korea, both allies of the Soviet Union, and in China. The specialists in terrorism reported that other training had been provided in Czechoslovakia for Italy's Red Brigades and in North Korea for the Japanese Red Army. Cuban Link Is Seen

Cuba is also thought to have trained terrorists for action in Latin America and to have been a conduit through which weapons, either captured from the United States in Vietnam or obtained from the Soviet Union, have been shipped to Latin America.

The diplomatic note from the Soviet Union that was reflected in a dispatch carried by Tass, the Soviet press agency, said that the Soviet Union had supported measures to prevent air piracy. Another Tass dispatch said that the Soviet Union had criticized the seizure of the Americans diplomats in Iran.

The note defended a Soviet right to assist national movements of independence. The Tass dispatch said that Mr. Haig's reasoning would have made terrorists out of George Washington and other early American leaders.

Quelques semaines plus tard ...


U.S. STUDY DISCOUNTS SOVIET TERROR ROLE

By JUDITH MILLER, Special to the New York Times
29 March 1981
The New York Times
Copyright 1981 The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved.

WASHINGTON, March 28 -- A draft report produced by the Central Intelligence Agency has concluded that there is insufficient evidence to substantiate Administration charges that the Soviet Union is directly helping to foment international terrorism, Congressional and Administration sources said today.

William J. Casey, Director of Central Intelligence, has asked his analysts, the sources said, to review their conclusions, given the substantial opposition to the report from other agencies.

The draft estimate, produced by the C.I.A.'s National Foreign Assessments Center, has stirred debate within Administration foreign policy circles, as foreign affairs spokesmen have publicly accused the Soviet Union of training, equipping, and financing international terrorist groups.

The review of the draft estimate has once again raised questions about the relationship between intelligence officials and policy makers, with some C.I.A. officials concerned that the agency is coming under pressure to tailor its analysis to fit the policy views of the Administration.

Charges in Last Administration

Similar charges were made during the Carter Administration and resulted in frequently bitter exchanges between policy makers and intelligence officials.

Bruce C. Clark, who heads the agency's assessments, or analysis unit, is retiring from the C.I.A. in April, in what officials said was a personal decision unrelated to the dispute over the intelligence estimate on terrorism.

One official said that a successor had not been named, but another indicated that Mr. Clark's successor would be the current director of the agency's operations unit, John McMahon.

The special national intelligence estimate on terrorism was begun soon after the Administration took office, officials said. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. said on Jan. 28 in his first news conference that the Soviet Union, as part of a ''conscious policy,'' undertook the ''training, funding and equipping'' of international terrorists.

The Administration has subsequently said that combatting international terrorism is one of its key foreign policy objectives. 'Ample Evidence' on Soviet Role

In addition, Richard V. Allen, President Reagan's national security adviser, said in an interview with ABC News this week that ''ample evidence'' had been accumulated to demonstrate the Soviet Union's involvement in international terrorism. Mr. Allen also said that the Soviet Union was ''probably'' supporting the Palestine Liberation Organization, which he said must be identified as a terrorist organization, through financial assistance and through support of its ''main aims.''

Finally, Mr. Allen concluded that Israeli air raids into southern Lebanon should be generally recognized as a ''hot pursuit of a sort and therefore, justified.''

Officials said that the draft estimate contained some factual evidence to support charges that the Soviet Union was directly aiding and abetting terrorist groups, but that in many instances the evidence of such involvement was either murky or nonexistent.

The estimate, which was circulated for comment to the State Department, National Security Council, Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency, stirred angry debate and response. Defining 'Terrorism' a Problem

Some officials described the dispute as ''definitional,'' that is, that agency officials found it difficult to agree on a common working definition of what constitutes a terrorist group.

Officials from the Defense Intelligence Agency criticized the document because, they said, the facts it contained did not support what one official termed the agency's ''weasel-worded'' conclusion that evidence was contradictory on the extent to which the Soviet Union could be regarded as a conscious principle agent of terrorism.

Soon after the draft document was circulated and began generating comment, Mr. Casey asked to review the report. After reading the estimate, he asked that the estimate be reviewed.

''That's really the way the process is supposed to work,'' said one knowledgeable official. ''The estimate is supposed to reflect the views of other agencies and it's not unusual that it would be restudied and rewritten after the agencies have commented.''

Other Administration and Congressional officials, however, voiced concern that the agency was once again being asked to tailor its views to fit the public pronouncements of senior Administration officials.

''There would not have been a review if the estimate's conclusions had totally supported the Administration's charges,'' the official said.

Et un mois plus tard ...


U.S. TRIES TO BACK UP HAIG ON TERRORISM

By PHILIP TAUBMAN, Special to the New York Times
3 May 1981
The New York Times
Copyright 1981 The New York Times Company. All Rights Reserved.


WASHINGTON, May 2 -- In late January, eight days after the inauguration of President Reagan and three days after the new Administration's first Cabinet-level meeting on terrorism, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. accused the Soviet Union of ''training, funding and equipping'' international terrorists.

His words caught the Government's intelligence agencies by surprise. Now, three months later, with resistance to terrorism firmly established as a main focus of foreign policy, the agencies are still scrambling to catch up with Mr. Haig's comments, intelligence officials said.

An intelligence report on terrorism, begun after Mr. Haig had spoken, is nearing completion after several false starts. Officials said that it supported some but not all of Mr. Haig's sweeping charges.

That gap is one of several problems that have dogged the policy on terrorism since it began evolving in January. The Administration's pronouncements about fighting terrorism, for example, exceed its ability to predict, prevent and respond to terrorist acts, a review of capabilities in the State Department, Defense Department and intelligence agencies shows.

Administration spokesmen have also been imprecise in defining terrorism, scholars who study the subject said, leading to public confusion about exactly what the policy covers.

The policy on terrorism was enunciated before State Department officials had fully considered how it would mesh with other policies, including relations with the Soviet Union. Some officials question whether terrorism is an appropriate focus for the foreign policy of the United States.

As a result, Administration officials acknowledged, an effort to create a forceful and popular policy about a serious international problem has failed to crystallize.

Interviews with officials at the White House, State Department, Defense Department and intelligence agencies indicate that the underlying source of difficulty was a failure to coordinate preparatory work on the policy.

When President Reagan's National Security Council, the senior body formulating foreign policy, held its first meeting on Jan. 26, terrorism was the main subject on the agenda.

The American hostages held in Iran for more than a year had been freed the week before, and terrorism was on everyone's mind, officials recalled. The participants, including President Reagan, Vice President Bush and the Secretaries of State and Defense, were briefed in the Cabinet Room of the White House by Anthony C.E. Quainton, director of the State Department's Office for Combatting Terrorism. Need for Forceful Policy Seen

No specific decisions were made, officials said. The participants agreed that the Administration should develop a forceful policy, and a review of intelligence information and collection capabilities was proposed.

The next day, Mr. Reagan welcomed the former hostages at the White House and declared, ''Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution.''

On Jan. 28, Mr. Haig, appearing at his first news conference as Secretary of State, made the charges against the Soviet Union. ''International terrorism will take the place of human rights in our concern because it is the ultimate abuse of human rights,'' he said after having accused the Soviet Union of supporting terrorism.

Later Mr. Haig added that the Russians ''are involved in conscious policy, in programs, if you will, which foster, support and expand'' terrorism.

The remarks, though made in response to questions, seemed to be a major pronouncement by the new Administration and marked a significant shift from the Carter Administration's emphasis on human rights. Two Key Questions Unresolved

They immediately raised two questions: What did Mr. Haig mean by terrorism? What evidence did he have to support the charges against the Soviet Union? Neither question has been resolved.

By not defining terrorism, experts said, Mr. Haig left unclear whether he meant traditional terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army in Japan, and classical forms of terrorism such as airplane hijackings and bombings, or whether he had a broader definition in mind that would include insurgent movements and wars of national liberation.

''Haig made a sweeping statement,'' said Walter Laqueur, University Professor of Government at Georgetown University here. ''He seemed to make terrorism synonymous with all forms of political violence. One should be a bit more careful.''

Brian M. Jenkins, who directs research on political violence at the Rand Corporation, said Mr. Haig might have kept his remarks general because he hoped to use the label of terrorist as a political weapon against the Soviet Union.

The ambiguity left the impression that a major priority of American foreign policy might be to combat airplane hijackings, bombings and political kidnappings and assassinations, a goal that troubled many officials.

''Combatting terrorism is a police problem,'' said Professor Laqueur. ''it is not a problem for the foreign minister of a global power.''

The questions about definitions spilled over into the intelligence community, where analysts were uncertain whether Mr. Haig was accusing the Soviet Union of directing individual terrorist groups or more generally supporting terrorism.

At the Central Intelligence Agency, senior officials, apparently surprised by the remarks, ordered a review of intelligence on terrorism. The first draft was rejected by William J. Casey, the Director of Central Intelligence, officials said.

Analysts complained that Mr. Casey had considered the draft faulty because it did not support Mr. Haig's assertions. Sources close to Mr. Casey said he felt the report had lacked substance and had been poorly prepared. Second Report Found Inadequate

Mr. Casey then asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to prepare a report on terrorism. That was finished recently, but was also found by Mr. Casey and other officials to be incomplete.

Intelligence officials said a third and final report was now being prepared, incorporating new material as well as sections of the two previous papers, and would be sent to the President soon.

This final report, according to officials familiar with it, concludes that the Soviet Union has not played a direct role in training or equipping traditional terrorist groups such as the Red Brigades or the Red Army and has no master plan to create terrorism around the world.

It does find that the Soviet Union has provided aid to organizations and nations, including the Palestine Liberation Organization and Libya, that support terrorism and engage in it themselves. Haig Is Said to Overstate Case

''Haig was generally correct, but he overstated the case,'' an intelligence official said, adding: ''Everyone has learned from this exercise that terrorism is not a high-priority item for our intelligence agencies and we frankly don't know very much about it.''

Mr. Haig has not identified the evidence that formed the basis for his remarks. Friends said that he had received briefings on terrorism from Western European intelligence services when he served as the commander of North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces in the late 1970's. They said that he might also have been influenced by the work of Claire Sterling, whose book, ''The Terror Network,'' speaks of alleged links between terrorist groups and the Soviet Union.

Mr. Haig is said to have particularly strong feelings about terrorism because he was the target of an unsuccessful terrorist attack in Belgium in 1979.

While officials and experts were debating about definitions and intelligence, the Administration began taking concrete steps to combat traditional forms of terrorism as well as state-sponsored terrorism such as the seizure of American diplomats in Iran. Deeds Don't Accord With Words

This activity, overseen by the State Department and coordinated by Deputy Secretary William P. Clark and Mr. Quainton, appears modest in comparison to the Administration's pronouncements.

''When you're dealing with terrorism, there is often a breathtaking descent from what you say to what you can do,'' said Mr. Jenkins, the Rand Corporation researcher.

The Administration's plan calls for improving security at American embassies, training diplomats and staff for the possibility that they will be taken hostage, and improving the crisis management system used for coordinating a response when a terrorist attack occurs against Americans or American facilities.

The Government is spending $41 million to improve security at 24 embassies viewed as particularly vulnerable. Improvements include construction of safe havens within embassy buildings, where the staff can resist an attack long enough to destroy sensitive documents and use emergency communications equipment to request help from local authorities or notify Washington.

Government employees assigned overseas are being offered a two-day course on terrorism that concentrates on what to expect and how to behave if they are seized as hostages.

The antiterrorism plan also includes efforts to upgrade intelligence capabilities, obtain international cooperation in combatting terrorism and clearly articulate policy. Stoessel's Testimony Is Recalled

Walter J. Stoessel, Under Secretary of State, summarized that policy in testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Feb. 25.

''The U.S. Government will make no concessions to terrorists,'' he said. ''We will not negotiate the payment of ransom nor the release of prisoners. We will work to insure that the perpetrators of terrorist acts are brought to justice.

''This Administration has made absolutely clear that it will react swiftly, effectively and with all the resources at its disposal should we face an act of state-supported violence and terrorism in the future.''

The Defense Department represents one of those resources, and officials there contend that the military has taken steps to improve its capacity to counter terrorism since the failure of the hostagerescue mission in Iran a year ago.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff formed a special counterterrorist task force. It is secret in name, location and personnel, but officials said it has taken steps to improve both tactics and logistics.

Some officials are concerned that all the attention focused on terrorism and the alleged Soviet support for it have diverted attention from more pressing international problems. Anti-Libyan Stance vs. Need for Oil

They also said that the emphasis on terrorism had not always meshed with other policies, and lines of authority were sometimes blurred.Because of the accusations against the Soviet Union, for example, Mr. Quainton's office on terrorism has begun to play a role in formulating American policy toward the Soviet Union, but how great a role remains uncertain.

With Libya, officials said, there is the issue of whether American opposition to its support for terrorism now runs deep enough to take precedence over the United States need for Libyan oil.

''There are a lot of tough questions to face when you try to combat terrorism,'' said Mr. Jenkins of the Rand Corporation. ''Making pronouncements against terrorism or adding another door to an embassy isn't a strategy against terrorism.''

Peter Dale Scott reconnaît qu'il aurait pu appeler son livre "La machine américaine" plutôt que "La machine de guerre américaine" parce que ce qu'il décrit déborde le "domaine" militaire proprement dit (même si celui-ci est très important). Il est par ailleurs d'accord avec l'idée selon laquelle les compagnies d'assurance peuvent aussi bénéficier d'un climat de tension.

Il parle beaucoup du terrorisme et des trafics de drogue.

Selon lui

"... une politique (américaine) plus saine pourrait surgir s'il était démontré que le 11-Septembre, comme Sibel Edmonds l'a sous-entendu, est un événement profond impliquant des éléments de ce que j'ai appelé la "connexion narcotique globale américaine".

Celle-ci fut par le passé responsable d'activités terroristes à travers le monde comme l'opération Condor, mais aussi de la consolidation des réseaux narcotiques et de gouvernements parallèles au Laos, au Pakistan, au Liban, en Turquie et en Colombie. Pendant des décennies, ce pays (les Etats-Unis) a été dans le déni quant à la complicité américaine dans ces événements, rejetant la responsabilité du terrorisme sur l'Union soviétique ("L'Empire du Mal") et plus récemment sur l'Irak et l'Iran ("l'Axe du Mal").

Venir à bout de cette façon de voir les choses ne sera pas chose aisée, mais constituera une marche en avant nécessaire afin de réduire le terrorisme et retrouver un monde plus sain."

_ _ _


En ce qui concerne "L'Empire du Mal" et "l'Axe du Mal", il y a une note (page 447)...

192. Cette idéologie trompeuse fut diffusée même à l'intérieur de la CIA. L'auteur Claire Sterling écrivit un livre intitulé The Terror Network, affirmant que "tous les groupes terroristes majeurs étaient contrôlés par l'Union Soviétique". Le livre, peu crédible aujourd'hui, fut chaudement soutenu par le secrétaire d'Etat de l'époque, Alexander Haig, qui le passa à William Casey, qui présenta cette thèse devant le Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Casey assigna aussi à des analystes de la CIA en terrorisme et des experts de l'Union soviétique la tâche de préparer une analyse de renseignements nationale spéciale se basant sur le livre de Sterling. Quand les experts rapportèrent que les affirmations de Sterling étaient fausses, Robert Gates, le directeur-adjoint des renseignements, fit réécrire leur conclusion négative par des analystes de bas niveau qui venaient de rejoindre l'Agence. Voir Mark Perry, "Eclipse : The Last Days of the CIA (1992) ...

La Société générale: 1822-1992
Par Jo Cottenier,Patrick De Boosere,Thomas Gounet

Pour information : un débat de H. Kissinger et A. Haig avec des étudiants de la Georgetown University en 1971 :

http://fr.scribd.com/doc/152073836/Kissinger-Haig-students-1971-pdf

Un important extrait de la revue suivante :





C'est une citation attribuée à Haig, extraite du même numéro (BIIC N°16, mai-juin 1983, page 29). La rubrique en question est "Opérations en cours", et la sous-rubrique s'intitule "Etats-Unis: Offensive sur la propagande".

Alexander Haig était à la 26° réunion du Bilderberg en 1978, avec Henry Kissinger ...

"Western Issues Aired". The Washington Post. April 24, 1978. "The three-day 26th Bilderberg Meeting concluded at a secluded cluster of shingled buildings in what was once a farmer's field. Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter's national security adviser, Swedish Prime Minister Thorbjorrn Falldin, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger and NATO Commander Alexander M. Haig Jr. were among 104 North American and European leaders at the conference."

http://www.disa.ukzn.ac.za/webpages/DC/Acn9383/Acn9383.pdf

Alexander Haig avait en tout cas le soutien de Kissinger ... (proche de Etienne Davignon, notamment via le Bilderberg)

Le numéro complet du BIIC n°16 de mai-juin 1983 est sur :

http://fr.scribd.com/doc/156930865/BIIC-n%C2%B016-mai-juin-1983

Voir à la page 29 ce qui concerne Alexander Haig

Pittsburgh Post-Gazette - 25 avr. 1978  

http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/02/world/haig-to-discuss-missile-worries-at-rome-parley.html

HAIG TO DISCUSS MISSILE WORRIES AT ROME PARLEY

By BERNARD GWERTZMAN, Special to the New York Times

Published: May 2, 1981


WASHINGTON, May 1— Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig Jr. flew to Rome today to meet with allied foreign ministers on their concerns about whether the Reagan Administration will be ready to open discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting medium-range nuclear missiles in Europe.

Yesterday a senior West German official said that Bonn wanted the spring meeting of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to obtain from the Americans ''a clear signal for the time frame'' for such negotiations.

Those talks, though they are not likely to produce immediate results, are necessary so that the West German and other European governments can justify the deployment of a new generation of American-built missiles in Europe.

Mr. Haig, according to State Department officials, had sought approval from President Reagan for permission to announce that the talks would start within a month, but as of this morning Mr. Haig had still not received the go-ahead. His aides said, however, that it was possible that he would receive it in Rome before the NATO meeting on Monday and Tuesday.

Haig Concerned About Lebanon

Besides preparing for the alliance meeting, Mr. Haig's chief concern before his departure was the situation in Lebanon. After testifying before a Senate Appropriations subcommittee this morning, Mr. Haig said that the situation in Lebanon, because of the possibility of an increase in Syrian and Israeli fighting, was ''very, very tense.''

Later, the State Department issued a statement saying that the situation had been ''relatively quiet'' in the last 24 hours. ''Governments in many parts of the world have been trying hard and responsibly to assist in calming the tense and potentially explosive situation in Lebanon,'' it said.

As part of the effort, Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin of the Soviet Union met for 35 minutes with Walter J. Stoessel Jr., the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Mr. Dobrynin told reporters afterward that ''we are doing our share'' to ease the crisis.

Mr. Dobrynin denied reports that Soviet military advisers had accompanied the introduction of Syrian antia@ircraft missiles in Lebanon. Mr. Haig also said this morning that he could not confirm such reports from the Middle East. Worries About 'Wrong Signal'

According to State Department officials, the timing of Soviet-American discussions on medium-range nuclear missiles has become a contentious issue in the Reagan Administration.

The Defense Department is worried about sending the ''wrong signal,'' the officials said, by sitting down with the Russians before the Administration's military and arms control policies have been fully formed.

But the State Department, aware of the political pressures on the West Germans and other Europeans, would like the NATO meeting to serve as a sounding board for an announcement about willingness to hold talks with the Russians soon.

On April 16, during a visit to Washington by Joseph M.A.H. Luns, the Secretary General of NATO, Mr. Haig said that the start of talks with the Russians was a matter ''under active consideration right now, and we'll have something to announce on this subject in the not-too-d@istant future.'' Proceeding on 'Two Tracks'

Mr. Haig made it clear that he believed that the United States was obligated, as the result of a NATO decision in December 1979, to proceed on ''two tracks,'' the deployment of 572 new missiles in Europe and discussions with the Russians on limiting such weapons on both sides.

Before the start of the alliance meeting, Mr. Haig will confer with President Sandro Pertini of Italy and have an audience with Pope John Paul II.

The Secretary will have several meetings with individual foreign ministers and will also confer with the British, Canadian, French and West German Foreign Ministers as a group on questions dealing with resuming talks on independence for South-West Africa, also known as Namibia.

Testifying before the Senate Appropriations subcommittee, Mr. Haig confirmed published reports that the insurgents in El Salvador were receiving arms through new channels, now that Nicaragua has blocked the passage of arms through its territory, but he said that the amount of arms was not substantial.

http://julesbonnotdelabande.blogspot.be/2009/12/7-gladio-la-guerre-secrete-des-etats.html

(...)

Après s'être imposé quelques années d'exil dans les cercles fascistes argentins [Au sujet des liens entre Gelli, la P2, et l'extrême droite argentine, voir Martin Andersen, Dossier Secreto : Argentina's Desaparecidos and the Myth of the « Dirty War » (Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1993), chapitres 10 et 20.], il (Licio Gelli) se vit rappeler en Italie comme franc-maçon. Accédant rapidement au poste suprême, il (Licio Gelli) commença en 1969 à fraterniser avec le général Alexander Haig, alors assistant d'Henry Kissinger, le chef de la sécurité nationale du président Nixon.

(...)

C'est après le Vietnam que Haig a travaillé pour Kissinger (1969) avant de passer au SHAPE (1974-1979). Il quitta le SHAPE pour devenir secrétaire d'Etat sous Reagan...

Haig a ensuite travaillé dans le secteur privé ...

La Société générale: 1822-1992
By Jo Cottenier, Patrick de Boosere, Thomas Gounet






Le duo Kissinger - Haig est régulièrement cité comme ayant encouragé la stratégie de la tension...

Kissinger, c'est (notamment) le Bilderberg (avec Davignon) et Haig, c'est le SHAPE (sa candidature a été soutenue par Kissinger) et le Stay-behind ...


Voir aussi :

http://www.radioradicale.it/exagora/p2-lhistoire-secrete-1-la-perquisition-de-castiglion-fibocchi

(...)

Certains titres de ce matériel offrent un profil significatif du caractère des archives gelliens: Calvi Roberto - conflit avec Banca d’Italia; Rizzoli - lettre Brigades Rouges; Claudio Martelli; Tassan Din - Mouvements fonds - Ortolani, Gelli Licio - dossier personnel - réservé; accord financement Flaminio Piccoli - Rizzoli - Calvi; contrat ENI-Petromin; Gén. Alexander Haig; Ambassade d’Argentine; accord groupe Rizzoli-Caracciolo-Scalfari… (3)

(3.) Tout le matériel sequestré à Castiglion Fibocchi a été publié par la Commission P2 dans les actes par la Chambre et le Sénat avec la dénomination DOC XXIII, N·2 quater, vol. I, tomes I, II, III et IV.

http://fr.scribd.com/doc/156930865/BIIC-n%C2%B016-mai-juin-1983

(page 15)





(...)

Plus de détails sur les fonctions de Alexander Haig dans le privé :

http://wikispooks.com/ISGP/organisations/introduction/PEHI_Alexander_Haig_bio.htm

(il faisait lui aussi partie des chevaliers de Malte)

http://www.nytimes.com/1982/09/07/business/business-people-united-technologies-calls-on-haig-again.html

BUSINESS PEOPLE; United Technologies Calls on Haig Again

Published: September 7, 1982

Alexander M. Haig Jr., the former Secretary of State, has been rehired by his old employer, albeit on a part-time basis. The United Technologies Corporation, one of the nation's biggest industrial concerns, announced yesterday that Mr. Haig, who stepped down as Secretary of State late in June, would act as a consultant and chairman of a soon-to-be-formed International Advisory Committee that will counsel the company on global business policies.

Before his return to Government duty, the 57-year-old retired United States Army general had served as president and chief operating officer of United Technologies from December 1979 until January 1981. That position has remained vacant since his departure.

The diversified aircraft manufacturer, which had $14 billion in sales last year, stressed that the post was a part-time one and not a prelude to Mr. Haig's return as a company officer. The company would not disclose Mr. Haig's salary. He will continue to work in Washington and not out of Hartford, where United Technologies is based. Mr. Haig recently accepted a position as a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute's Washington office.

Harry J. Gray, United Technologies' chairman and chief executive and a takeover specialist, said in a prepared statement that Mr. Haig will be called upon to produce assessments of social, political and economic trends throughout the world. ''Those assessments,'' he said, ''will be critically important to U.T.C. as we plan future growth in world markets.''

The company still relies heavily on Government military contracts and has been looking abroad for growth. About 40 percent of its business flows from foreign markets. Among its products are Pratt & Whitney jet engines, Carrier air conditioners, Otis elevators, Mostek semiconductors and Sikorsky helicopters.

Among Mr. Haig's initial tasks will be to select individuals to serve on the International Advisory Committee and to determine how it will function. He will also advise Mr. Gray on domestic and international business matters.

Before his appointment as president of United Technologies, Mr. Haig had been President Nixon's chief of staff at the time of Mr. Nixon's resignation. More recently, he was supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He also had considered becoming a candidate for the Presidency in 1980 before deciding against the move.

Un lecteur attentif recommande

"The Internet Archive".

http://www.google.fr/search?as_q=the+internet+archive&as_epq=&as_oq=&as_eq=&as_nlo=&as_nhi=&lr=&cr=&as_qdr=all&as_sitesearch=&as_occt=any&safe=images&as_filetype=&as_rights=

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Archive

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Archive

Voir notamment: "The Wayback Machine".

http://archive.org/web/web.php

Voici quelque chose que j'ai trouvé sur Alexander Haig :

http://archive.org/details/cmalp_00006

General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. Speaks on "Facing the Threat from Abroad" (May 21, 1979)

Alternate Title: General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Supreme Commander of the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), speaks on "Facing the Threat from Abroad," regarding relations with the Soviet Union in the early 1980s

Note: Part 2 starts with two minutes of silence.

Description: General Alexander M. Haig, Jr. speaks at the annual Pepperdine Associates Banquet on May 21, 1979. He discusses the pressure that the Soviet Union is pressing on countries such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East with an expectation that this pressure will both increase and expand. Haig encourages the United States to recover from its "post-Vietnam traumatized attitude" and "accept the growing of the Soviet power throughout the world."

Il faut s'intéresser à Michael Ledeen ...

http://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Michael_Ledeen

(...)

En 1974, Michael Ledeen approfondit à Rome ses études sur le fascisme et le terrorisme. En 1977, il rentra à Washington, D.C., pour joindre le Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) affilié à l'université de Georgetown. Il devient alors directeur du Washington Quaterly publié par le CSIS.

Il continue à voyager souvent en Italie, et reconnut lors d'un entretien au Wall Street Journal avoir été salarié en 1980 des services secrets militaires italiens - SISMI en tant que consultant3 — Le SISMI était impliqué à l'époque avec la loge P2 et Gladio dans la stratégie de la tension, durant les années de plomb. Selon Francesco Pazienza, chef du « Super-SISMI », ils montent ensemble le Billygate (en) qui plombe la campagne de Jimmy Carter en révélant des liens entre son frère et le régime libyen 4.

Il devint ensuite le conseiller spécial du secrétaire d'État Alexander Haig en 1981 (Haig était l'ancien chef du SACEUR, le commandement central du SHAPE (l'OTAN) en Europe, qui dirigeait directement le réseau Gladio). De façon intéressante, Michael Ledeen a été, avec Pazienza, l'un des plus ardents propagateurs de la thèse selon laquelle les services secrets bulgares auraient été derrière la tentative d'assassinat du pape Jean-Paul II en 1981 par un membre des Loups gris, Mehmet Ali Ağca. Selon certains, cette théorie aurait permis de détourner l'attention vers le KGB, alors que les Loups gris étaient infiltrés par des agents du réseau paramilitaire Gladio.

(...)

Un ouvrage de Michael Ledeen ...

Machiavelli on Modern Leadership: Why Machiavelli's Iron Rules Are As Timely And Important Today As Five Centuries Ago





Niccolo Machiavelli, one of the eminent minds of the Italian Renaissance, spent much of a long and active lifetime trying to determine and understand what exceptional qualities of human character-- and what surrounding elements of fortune, luck, and timing-- made great men great leaders successful in war and peace.

In perhaps the liveliest book on Machiavelli in years, Michael A. Ledeen measures contemporary movers and doers against the timeless standards established by the great Renaissance writer. Titans of statecraft (Margaret Thatcher, Francois Mitterrand, Pope John Paul II, Ronald Reagan, and Bill Clinton); business and finance (Bill Gates); Wall Street and investing (Warren Buffett); the military (Colin Powell), and sports (Michael Jordan) are judged by Machiavelli's precepts on leadership and the proper use of power. The result is a wide-ranging and scintillating study that illuminates the thoughts of the Renaissance master and the actions of today's truly towering figures as well as the character-challenged pretenders to greatness.

L'article du Morning Star du 5 février 1983 sur la lettre de Haig à Luns (OTAN) est sur

http://fr.scribd.com/doc/165033326/Nato-Haig-Luns-Morning-Star-5-Feb-1983

Extrait :